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DEFUSING THE "NOT IN MY BACK YARD"
SYNDROME: AN APPROACH TO FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL
IMPEDIMENTS TO THE SITING OF
PCB DISPOSAL FACILITIES
WILLIAM L. ANDREENt
Because polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) present severe environ-
mental hazards, Congress enacted a special provision in the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA) requiring the Environmental Protection
Agency to establish proper PCB disposal methods. Responding to local
fears, however, some communities have passed ordinances that either di-
rectly or indirectly ban local siting of PCB disposalfacilities. If allowed,
such local action would jeopardize the federal regulatory scheme. Pro-
fessorAndreen contends that, although the language in TSCA is phrased
inartfully, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress clearly in-
tended the federal regulatory scheme to establish minimum standards
for safe PCB disposal Congress, however, preserved the authority of
state and local governments to set more stringent disposal standards that
are consistent with the congressional goal of safe PCB disposal He ar-
gues that state or local action imposing a siting ban is inconsistent with
this congressional goal and is thereby impliedly preempted, unless
unique local conditions necessitate a ban as a matter of safety.
In 1976 Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act (TCSA) 1 in
response to growing evidence of the dangers that toxic chemicals pose to public
health and the environment. TSCA directs the Administrator of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate all chemicals that
present "an unreasonable risk of injtiry to health or the environment."'2 Because
Congress was especially concerned with the hazards presented by
polychlorinated biphenyls, commonly called PCBs, 3 Congress included a provi-
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama. B.A. 1975, The College of Wooster;
J.D. 1977, Columbia University. The author was Assistant Regional Counsel, United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Region IV (Atlanta, Georgia) from 1979-1983. The author wishes to
express his appreciation to Gwen L. Windle and J. Lane Bearden for their fine research assistance.
The author also thanks the Research Grants Committee at the University of Alabama, whose finan-
cial assistance helped in the preparation of this Article.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982)) [here-
inafter cited as TSCA § -, 15 U.S.C. § -].
2. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
3. PCBs are synthetic chemicals that belong to a group of organic chemicals known as chlo-
rinated hydrocarbons. PCBs were produced in the United States from 1929 until 1977 for a variety
of commercial purposes. Because they have a high boiling point, chemical stability, and low electri-
cal conductivity, PCBs were used as cooling liquids in electrical transformers and capacitors, and as
heat transfer and hydraulic fluids. PCBs are hazardous to health, however, even at extremely low
levels. Tests on laboratory animals have shown that PCBs can cause cancers, tumors, reproductive
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sion that expressly ordered the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate a rule
prescribing PCB disposal methods.4 That rule, which became effective April 18,
1978, established a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the proper disposal of
PCBs.5
Although the disposal rule provides the technical criteria for constructing
safe PCB disposal facilities, attempts to locate such facilities often have encoun-
tered local opposition. Local citizens, fueled by fear that a disposal facility, re-
gardless of its design, will turn into a ruinous dump, 6 typically have responded
failures, birth defects, gastric and liver disorders, eye disorders, skin lesions, swollen limbs, and other
health problems. Since they decompose slowly, PCBs remain in the environment for decades after
their release. PCBs also are absorbed readily and stored in the fatty tissues of all organisms. The
concentration of PCBs in the fatty tissues of organisms will increase over time by a process known as
bioaccumulation, even if the exposure to PCBs is low. Bioaccumulation may result in significant
concentrations of PCBs at the end of the food chain, namely, human consumption. Office of Pesti-
cides and Toxic Substances, EPA, Toxic Information Series TS-793 (1980); see 42 Fed. Reg. 6532,
653343 (1977).
4. TSCA § 6(e)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A).
5. EPA Disposal and Marking Rule for PCBs, 43 Fed. Reg. 7150 (1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 761.1, .3, .40 to .180 (1984)). Theoretically, the disposal of PCBs also could be regulated under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The Solid Waste Disposal Act, amended by Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6987 (1982)), amended by Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-616, 96 Stat. 3221 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i) [hereinafter cited as RCRA § -, 42
U.S.C. § -].
Enacted into law ten days after TSCA, RCRA authorizes the EPA to establish a complex sys-
tem for regulating hazardous waste. RCRA §§ 3001-3019, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939a; see J.
QUARLES, FEDERAL REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: A GUIDE TO RCRA (1982). RCRA
requires the EPA to issue regulations that identify and list those materials that are deemed to be
"hazardous waste." RCRA § 3001, 42 U.S.C. § 6921. The EPA also must promulgate regulations
establishing "standards" governing "owners and operators of facilities for the treatment, storage, or
disposal of hazardous waste." RCRA § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924. When the EPA promulgated its
final rule designating those materials that are "hazardous waste" under RCRA, the agency stated
that it had decided not to regulate the disposal of PCBs pursuant to RCRA. 45 Fed. Reg. 33004,
33086 (1980). That decision was reiterated in 1982 when the EPA denied a citizen's petition submit-
ted under § 21 of TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2620, that requested the EPA to transfer the control of PCBs
from TSCA to RCRA's authority. As a result, the disposal of PCBs continues to be regulated under
TSCA. 47 Fed. Reg. 2379, 2380 (1982); see also 49 Fed. Reg. 49784, 49789-90 (1984) (Responding
to a rulemaking petition from the State of Michigan, the EPA again declined to list PCBs as "haz-
ardous waste" under RCRA.).
The discharge of PCBs into waters of the United States has been regulated by the EPA under
the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982)) (also known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act) [hereinafter referred
to as the Clean Water Act]. Section 307 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982), autho-
rizes the EPA to establish effluent limitations or effluent standards, or both, for "toxic pollutants."
In 1977 the agency promulgated effluent standards for PCBs that prohibited their discharge into
waters of the United States from PCB manufacturers and from the manufacturers of electrical ca-
pacitors and electrical transformers. 42 Fed. Reg. 6555 (1977) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 129.105
(1984)). This rulemaking withstood a legal challenge in Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598
F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The emission of PCBs as an air pollutant could be regulated under the Clean Air Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)). Under Section
112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982), the EPA is empowered to set emission standards
for hazardous air pollutants "at the level which. . . provides an ample margin of safety to protect
the public health." The EPA, however, has not proposed or promulgated emission standards for
PCBs. See D. CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS § 3.26 (1981 & Supp.
1984).
6. This fear stems from a number of factors including health and safety concerns, anxiety
about declining property values, the stigma attached to an area that is used as a dump site, concern
resulting from the poor management records of many disposal facilities in the past, and concerns
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with a resounding "not in my back yard."' 7 On occasion such fear has prompted
demonstrations and even acts of civil disobedience in efforts to block the con-
struction of an unwanted disposal facility. 8 More often, however, communities
averse to local siting of PCB disposal facilities have taken less dramatic but more
potent action by enacting ordinances that directly or indirectly ban PCB dispo-
sal in that community.9
However much sympathy one might have for such angry and frightened
about the developer's liability for the postclosure stage of the operation. S. BOYLE, AN ANALYSIS
OF SITING NEW HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES THROUGH A COMPENSATION
AND INCENTIVES APPROACH 1 .(1982); see D. MORELL & C. MAGORIAN, SITING HAZARDOUS
WASTE FACILITIES: LOCAL OPPOSITION AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION 22-24 (1982).
7. See F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER, & D. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 603
(1984); Aim, "Not in My Backyard'" Facing the Siting Question, 10 EPA J. 8, 9 (Oct. 1984); Wolf,
Public Opposition to Hazardous Waste Sites: The Self-Defeating Approach to National Hazardous
Waste Control Under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 8 ENVTL.
Ars. L. REV. 463, 476 (1980); see also Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction to State Con-
trol of Hazardous Waste Facility Location, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 1, 3 (1981)
("[C]ommunities throughout the country are using their powers to allocate land uses to exclude
these facilities.").
8. For example, residents of Warren County, North Carolina staged a long series of protest
marches and demonstrations in the fall of 1982 seeking to halt the operation of a PCB disposal
facility in the county. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1982, at A16, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1982, at
A23, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1982, at A10, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1982, at A6, col. 6;
N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1982, at A19, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1982, at A18, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
Sept. 14, 1982, at A20, col. 3. The residents were particularly worried about possible groundwater
contamination from the facility. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1982, at L31, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 25,
1982, at A17, col. 1. The facility was a component of a Superfund-financed cleanup executed by the
State of North Carolina of about 32,000 cubic yards of soil contaminated with PCBs by "midnight
dumpers." N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1982, at A18, col. 1. During the course of the protests, approxi-
mately 523 people were arrested for attempting to block trucks loaded with PCB-contaminated soil
from entering the disposal facility. TIME, Nov. 1, 1982, at 29.
9. At least four jurisdictions have enacted ordinances that ban the storage or disposal of PCBs
within their borders. The city of Dayton, Ohio enacted ordinances that prohibited the storage of
PCBs within the city limits. DAYTON, OHIO, REVISED CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES §§ 97.01-
.09, 97.97-.99 (1980). These ordinances became the subject of controversy in SED, Inc. v. City of
Dayton, 515 F. Supp. 737 (D. Ohio 1981). See infra notes 107-27 and accompanying text. Warren
County, North Carolina barred all PCB storage or disposal within the county. Warren County,
N.C., Ordinance Prohibiting the Storage and Disposal of PCB's (Aug. 21, 1978). The validity of this
ordinance was litigated in Warren County v. State of North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C.
1981). See infra notes 144-72 and accompanying text. Union County, Arkansas also enacted an
ordinance that prohibited disposal of PCBs. Union County, Ark., Ordinance 38 (Sept. 12, 1978).
Finally, the city of Chickasaw, Alabama prohibited the storage and disposal of PCBs for longer than
24 hours. Chickasaw, Ala., Ordinance 1040 (Feb. 28, 1984).
Another community has passed an ordinance that purported to ban partially the storage and
disposal of PCBs within its jurisdiction. Logan Township, New Jersey prohibited the "location" of
PCBs in "environmentally sensitive" areas within the township. Logan Township, N.J., Ordinance
Prohibiting the Location of Polychlorinated Biphenyls in Environmentally Sensitive Areas in the
Township of Logan, County of Gloucester, State of New Jersey (Dec. 7, 1983). The definition of
"environmentally sensitive" areas is expansive and conceivably could encompass much, perhaps all,
of the township. Id.
The ordinances that seem to ban indirectly PCB disposal or storage have taken various forms.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. encountered several ordinances that posed obstacles to its plan to
dispose of PCBs aboard incinerator ships in the Gulf of Mexico. The plan involved using a port
facility to load the PCBs onto the ships within the city limits of Mobile, Alabama. See Birmingham
Post-Herald, May 23, 1984, at E2, col. 1. The city of Mobile consequently passed an ordinance
prohibiting the construction of plants, facilities, or structures that process or store hazardous waste,
including PCBs, within the 500-year flood plain that encompassed the waterfront area of the city.
Mobile, Ala., Ordinance 65-122 (Dec. 13, 1977) (amended Feb. 21, 1984). The ordinance appears to
have obstructed Chemical Waste Management's plan to place PCB storage tanks at its port facility,
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host communities, the unrestricted passage of such bans could have dire conse-
quences. If all PCB disposal bans were successful in preventing the siting of
PCB disposal facilities, few communities, if any, would be amenable to their
construction. Any community in which a PCB disposal facility was located
would likely become stigmatized as the nation's dumping ground. Such a com-
munity, moreover, would assume an inordinate share of the responsibility in
solving what is essentially a national problem. Under these circumstances it is
difficult to conceive of any community that would acquiesce in the siting of a
PCB disposal facility within its borders if it had the choice. 10
Congress clearly did not foresee a proliferation of disposal bans when it
passed TSCA. Rather, it envisioned the construction and operation of safe PCB
disposal facilities that would eliminate the environmental contamination caused
by improper disposal of PCBs. 11 Local bans, however, may not be directed so
much at preventing improper disposal as they are designed to prohibit all PCB
disposal.12 If given effect, such bans would aggravate an existing shortage in the
availability of safe disposal facilities1 3 and thereby frustrate a vital purpose of
TSCA because large quantities of PCBs could not be disposed of in a proper
manner. Local prohibitions, therefore, might produce a perverse result: the en-
couragement of secret dumping of PCBs in an unregulated and dangerous man-
ner. 14 One evil at which TSCA was aimed thus will go uncured unless those
bans that are unrelated to the need for safe disposal are preempted by the federal
regulatory scheme.15
which would have accepted and stored PCBs while the incinerator ships were at sea. See Current
Developments, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2214-15 (Apr. 8, 1983).
In addition, the city of Chickasaw, Alabama, which is adjacent to the planned port facility in
Mobile, enacted ordinances that forbade trucks carrying PCBs to use a particular street, placed a
weight limitation on another street for trucks similarly laden, and imposed numerous other restric-
tions on the transportation of PCBs through the city. Chickasaw, Ala., Ordinance 1040 (Feb. 28,
1984); Chickasaw, Ala., Ordinance 964 (Oct. 20, 1981). These ordinances have been challenged in
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. City of Chickasaw, No. 84-0459-H-S (S.D. Ala. filed Apr. 4,
1984). Among other contentions, Chemical Waste Management alleged that the ordinances were
preempted by TSCA. Id.
10. The local benefits of increased tax revenues and new jobs rarely outweigh the local costs
resulting from potential health and environmental risks, the noise and congestion caused by in-
creased traffic, and the stigma attached to being a site for hazardous waste disposal. Bacow &
Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6
HARV. ENVTI.. L. REv. 265, 268-69 (1982); see D. MORELL & C. MAGORIAN, supra note 6, at 56-
62.
11. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
12. See, eg., infra note 172 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
15. An analogous problem with siting hazardous waste facilities exists under RCRA. See
Florini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperation or Confusion?, 6 HARV.
ENvTI.. L. REV. 307, 324-27 (1982). With regard to RCRA, the EPA has suggested that inadequate
disposal capacity will lead to transportation of waste over longer distances, thereby increasing the
likelihood of spills, on-site stockpiling of waste, and illegal dumping due to increased disposal cost.
EPA Standards for Hazardous Waste Land Disposal Facilities (RCRA), 46 Fed. Reg. 12,414,
12,415-16 (1981); see Davidson, An Analysis of Existing Requirements for Siting and Permitting Haz-




TSCA contains an explicit preemption provision.1 6 With a few clearly de-
lineated exceptions, it preempts state and local regulatory requirements on the
date certain federal rules or orders become effective. Congress, however, ex-
cluded state and local disposal requirements from the ambit of the general pre-
emption provision 17 and also provided that federal disposal rules may not
require anyone to act in violation of state or local requirements.
18
Although some commentators have suggested that Congress intentionally
drafted TSCA in this manner to impose a form of reverse preemption whereby
state and local disposal requirements preempt federal law, 19 the EPA has con-
tended that Congress only meant to give state and local governments the flexibil-
ity to impose requirements more stringent than required by federal law. The
agency, however, belatedly recognized that efforts to ban PCB disposal would
frustrate the national program for safe PCB disposal. Thus, the EPA has argued
more recently that all outright bans are void as obstacles to achieving one of the
primary purposes of TSCA.20 Additionally, a number of trial courts have had
an opportunity to grapple with this issue. Their efforts have produced an er-
ratic, inconsistent pattern of analysis.
This Article seeks to explain the sources of this confusion and to advance a
suggested method of analysis. Part I explores those features of TSCA and its
regulatory scheme that are crucial to an understanding of the issue. Part II
discusses and critiques the administrative and judicial interpretations concerning
the effect of the federal PCB disposal rule on state and local disposal
requirements.
Finally, Part III of the Article argues that the legislative history of TSCA
demonstrates that Congress intended the federal PCB disposal rule to set mini-
mum standards for safe disposal, thereby preempting by implication less strin-
gent state and local requirements. Congress, however, preserved the power of
state and local governments to tailor more stringent requirements that are con-
sistent with the goal of safe disposal. Nevertheless, total bans-and those re-
quirements that impose practically unattainable conditions, resulting in
constructive bans--obstruct the national goal of safely disposing of PCBs; conse-
quently, they ordinarily are preempted by implication. Such bans, constructive
or actual, may be saved from preemption only when they serve to ensure safe
PCB disposal. Realistically, therefore, a ban may be given effect only on a show-
ing that some unique local geological or physical condition justifies a ban on
safety grounds.
I. THE ToxIc SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT
TSCA21 authorizes the EPA to review each new chemical before it is mar-
16. TSCA § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 2617.
17. TSCA § 18(a)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B).
18. TSCA § 6(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(6).
19. R. DRULEY & G. ORDWAY, THE Toxic SuBSTANcEs CONTROL AcT 68-69 (rev. ed. 1981).
20. See infra notes 63-70, 80-88 and accompanying text.
21. For thorough discussions of TSCA, see R. DRULEY & G. ORDWAY, supra note 19; Gaynor,
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keted, 22 as well as all existing chemicals, 23 to determine whether they may
"$present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment."' 24 If the
review indicates "there is a reasonable basis to conclude" that the chemical
"presents or will present an unreasonable risk," the EPA must promulgate regu-
lations under section 6 to "protect adequately against such risk."'25 Engrafted
onto this statutory scheme is a provision that singles out PCBs for special regu-
latory treatment.
26
A. Manufacturing and Processing Notices for New Chemicals
Section 5 is designed to provide the Administrator of the EPA with the
information necessary to determine whether a "new chemical substance" or a
"significant new use" for an existing chemical poses an unreasonable risk and
thus must be regulated under section 6.27 Subject to some minor exemptions,
2 8
any person who manufactures a new chemical29 or manufactures or processes a
chemical for a significant new use30 must notify the Administrator of the EPA at
least ninety days prior to manufacturing or processing. These premanufacturing
notices must contain certain information on the effect that the chemical or its
use will have on health and the environment.
31
The Toxic Substances Control Act: A Regulatory Morass, 30 VAND. L, REv. 1149 (1977); Note, The
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976: An Introductory Background and Analysis, 4 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 35 (1977).
22. TSCA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 2604.
23. TSCA § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2603.
24. TSCA § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605.
25. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
26. TSCA § 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e).
27. TSCA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 2604.
28. On a proper showing of safety, manufacturers or processors may obtain exemptions either
for test marketing purposes or when a chemical is an intermediate product. TSCA § 5(h)(1), (5), 15
U.S.C. § 2604(h)(1), (5). Exemptions also may be granted when test data would be duplicative of
other data received or being developed, or when the Administrator determines by rule that the
chemical will not present an unreasonable risk. TSCA § 5(h)(2), (4), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(2), (4).
Notice is not required for small quantities that are used in scientific research, provided certain condi-
tions are met. TSCA § 5(h)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3).
29. To qualify as a "new chemical substance," the chemical must not appear on the inventory
list required under § 8(b). TSCA § 8(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2607(b). This section requires that the Admin-
istrator compile, update, and publish a list of each chemical manufactured or processed in the
United States. A chemical for which a notice is submitted under § 5 must be placed on the list as of
the first date it was manufactured or processed in the United States. Id.
30. The Administrator designates by rule whether a use is a "significant new use" after consid-
ering the following: the expected "volume of manufacturing and processing" of the chemical; the
extent the use changes the type, form, and magnitude of human or environmental exposure; and the
anticipated methods of manufacturing, processing, distribution, and disposal. TSCA § 5(a)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 2604(a)(2).
31. Notices must provide any information on the effect of the chemical or its use on health or
the environment that either is in the possession or knowledge of the person giving notice or is reason-
ably ascertainable. The notices also must include proposed uses, data on the volume to be produced,
estimates of human exposure, and the proposed manner of disposal, insofar as these are known or
reasonably ascertainable to the person giving notice. TSCA §§ 5(d), 8(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(d),
2607(a)(2).
If the chemical is on the Administrator's "suspect list" of substances or uses that may present
an unreasonable risk, TSCA § 5(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b)(4), the person giving notice must submit
data that he believes demonstrate that the substance or its use will not present any unreasonable risk
of injury. TSCA § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b)(2).
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When the information provided is inadequate to evaluate what may be an
unreasonable risk, the Administrator is authorized either to issue a proposed
administrative order that is effective at the end of the notification period or to
seek a court order limiting or prohibiting the manufacture, processing, distribu-
tion, use, or disposal of the chemical.32 The Administrator may proceed by
administrative or judicial action to protect against unreasonable risk if sufficient
information indicates that the chemical will present such a risk before a section 6
rule can take effect.
33
B. Test Rules for New and Existing Chemicals
The most thorough testing requirements for potentially dangerous chemi-
cals are found in section 4 of TSCA.34 Whenever a new or existing chemical
may pose a risk to health or the environment and insufficient data exist to deter-
mine reasonably its effect on health or the environment, TSCA directs the Ad-
ministrator to promulgate a rule requiring the manufacturer or processor to
engage in intensive testing to obtain more data.35 Failure to c6mply with such a
testing rule can result in civil or criminal penalties or a court order compelling
specific performance and other relief.36 If the EPA receives test data or other
32. Before issuing such a proposed administrative order, the Administrator must determine
that, in the absence of sufficient information, the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce,
use, or disposal of the substance may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment or that significant human or environmental exposure to the substance is anticipated. If a man-
ufacturer or processor objects to the Administrator's order, the Administrator may seek injunctive
relief (or the Administrator may seek such relief in the first instance). A district court is directed to
issue the injunction if it finds that the information available to the Administrator is insufficient and
that the substance may present an unreasonable risk, or that substantial exposure to humans or the
environment may occur. TSCA § 5(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e).
33. A proposed rule may be issued under § 5(f) that limits the amount of a substance that is
manufactured, processed, or distributed, imposes prohibitions or restraints on the commercial use or
disposal of a substance, or requires certain additional safeguards such as warnings and instructions.
Such a proposed rule becomes effective when published. The Administrator, however, cannot pro-
hibit the manufacture of the substance by rule under § 5(f). The Administrator, on the other hand,
may issue a proposed order, effective at the expiration of the notification period, to prohibit manu-
facturing, processing, and distribution as well as uses and methods of disposal. Finally, the Admin-
istrator may seek injunctive relief. A district court must issue an injunction prohibiting
manufacture, processing, or distribution on a finding that the chemical presents an unreasonable
risk. TSCA § 5(f), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f).
34. TSCA § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2603.
35. TSCA § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a). A rule issued under subsection (a) must include stan-
dards for testing that are to be reviewed at least every 12 months. Once a testing rule is promulgated
for a particular chemical substance, any person who manufactures or processes that substance, or
intends to do so, must submit the required data unless exempted from doing so by the Administra-
tor. TSCA § 4(b), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b), (c).
The Administrator may grant such an exemption when the testing either would duplicate data
already submitted for an equivalent substance or duplicate data for an equivalent substance that is
being developed pursuant to a rule under § 4. TSCA § 4(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(c).
Section 4(e) establishes a committee to recommend a priority list of chemicals to which the
Administrator should give attention. The Administrator must initiate a testing rule within 12
months after the chemical is included on the priority list, or he must publish in the Federal Register
the reasons for not doing so. TSCA § 4(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e).
36. Under § 16, the Administrator can impose by order a civil penalty for failure to comply
with a testing rule. The order may be challenged in a court of appeals. If the civil penalty is not
paid, it may be recovered in a district court action. In addition to, or in lieu of, a civil penalty, a
criminal penalty may be sought for willful or knowing failure to comply with a testing rule. TSCA
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information indicating that the chemical may present a significant risk of serious
harm to human health, the Administrator must initiate action under TSCA to
prevent or reduce that risk.
37
C. Regulation
Section 6 provides the Administrator with the authority to regulate harmful
chemicals. 38 When premanufacturing notices, testing results, or other informa-
tion indicate that the manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal of a
chemical "presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury," the Adminis-
trator must promulgate one or more regulatory "requirements" to protect health
and the environment. 39 These requirements may include bans or quotas on the
manufacture, processing, or distribution of the chemical.4° The Administrator
also may stipulate labeling requirements, monitoring and testing, prohibitions or
restraints concerning commercial use, notice requirements, and the like.4' Fi-
nally, the Administrator may promulgate a rule under section 6(a)(6) "prohibit-
ing or otherwise regulating any manner or method of disposal" of the
chemical.42
Congress mandated specific regulatory controls for PCBs in section 6(e)
43
and ordered the Administrator by July 1, 1977, to "prescribe methods" to dis-
pose of PCBs and to require that PCBs be marked with warnings and certain
instructions.44 Congress also provided for the phased withdrawal of PCBs. As
of January 1, 1978, the manufacture, processing, distribution, or use of PCBs "in
any manner other than in a totally enclosed manner" was prohibited.4 5 Addi-
tionally, all manufacture was prohibited after January 1, 1979, and all processing
and distribution was prohibited after July 1, 1979.46 The Administrator may
grant exemptions from the final 1979 bans when no unreasonable risk would
result and good faith efforts were made to develop a chemical substitute. 47 In
addition, the final bans do not apply to the distribution in commerce of PCBs
§ 16, 15 U.S.C. § 2615. A district court also may compel compliance with a testing rule. TSCA
§ 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2616(a).
Section 7(a) allows the Adniinistrator to commence a civil action in district court for seizure of
an "imminently hazardous chemical substance." TSCA § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a). The Adminis-
trator also may seek other relief from the district courts, id., such as an order requiring notification
of risks, recall, repurchase, or replacement of the substance. TSCA § 7(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2606(b)(2). A chemical is "imminently hazardous" if it could cause serious or widespread injury
before a rule could be promulgated under § 6. TSCA § 7(0, 15 U.S.C. § 2606(0.
37. Such action may include either a § 6 rule or a civil action for seizure or other necessary
relief if the chemical presents an imminent hazard. TSCA § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2606; see supra note 36.
38. TSCA § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605.
39. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
40. TSCA § 6(a)(l)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(l)-(2).
41. TSCA § 6(a)(3)-(5), (7), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(3)-(5), (7).
42. TSCA §6(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(6).
43. TSCA § 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e).
44. TSCA § 6(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1).
45. TSCA § 6(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2).
46. TSCA § 6(e)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(3)(A).
47. TSCA § 6(e)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(3)(B).
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that were "sold for purposes other than resale" before July 1, 1979.48
D. PCB Disposal Rule
The original EPA disposal rule for PCBs was published on February 17,
1978.4 9 In its present form, the rule regulates the disposal of any chemical sub-
stance that contains fifty parts per million or more of PCBs.50 The rule estab-
lishes particular disposal methods depending on the form of PCBs-liquid,
contaminated soil, dredged materials, and so on-and the concentration of
PCBs in the substance.5 1 Incineration and placement in a chemical waste land-
fill are the two forms of disposal most often specified, 52 and elaborate require-
ments and safety precautions governing both types of disposal are set forth in the
rule.5 3 The EPA must approve all incinerators 54 and landfills55 prior to their
use.
E. Preemption
Congress attempted to reconcile TSCA's broad regulatory impact with the
interests of state and local governments in section 18,56 which states that TSCA
generally does not preempt state or local regulation of chemical substances.
57
Section 18, however, contains two significant exceptions. First, once the Admin-
48. TSCA § 6(e)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(3)(C).
49. EPA Disposal and Marking Rule for PCBs, 43 Fed. Reg. 7150 (1978). The EPA has
amended the rule on numerous occasions. See 43 Fed. Reg. 33918 (1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 31514
(1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 54296 (1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 20473 (1980); 47 Fed. Reg. 19526 (1982); 47 Fed.
Reg. 22098 (1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 37342 (1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 46980 (1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 54436
(1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 4467 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 5729 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 13181 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg.
15125 (1983); 49 Fed. Reg. 25239 (1984).
50. 40 C.F.R § 761.1(b) (1984). The original rule excluded PCBs in concentrations below 500
parts per million (ppm) from the ambit of regulation. 43 Fed. Reg. 7150, 7157 (1978). This was
amended to 50 ppm because the agency recognized that adverse effects result from concentrations
lower than 500 ppm. 44 Fed. Reg. 31514, 31516 (1979).
51. 40 C.F.R. § 761.60 (1984).
52. Id.
53. 40 C.F.R. § 761.70 (1984) establishes comprehensive requirements that an incinerator used
for burning PCBs must satisfy. For example, requirements for incinerating liquid PCBs include
specified combustion temperatures, continuous measurement of combustion temperatures, 99.9%
combustion efficiency, and monitoring and recording of combustion products and incineration oper-
ations. Id. § 761.70(a). In addition, the agency may impose other requirements "to ensure that
operation of the incinerator does not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment from PCBs." Id. § 671.70(d)(4)(ii).
Thorough technical requirements for chemical waste landfills used for PCB disposal are speci-
fied in 40 C.F.R. § 761.75 (1984). Those requirements concern requisite soil conditions, use of syn-
thetic membrane liners when necessary, acceptable hydrologic conditions, flood protection,
topography, monitoring systems, leachate collection, supporting facilities, and landfill operations.
Id. § 761.75(b). As with incineration, the EPA may impose additional requirements to ensure safe
operation. Id. § 761.75(c)(3)(ii).
54. Id. § 761.70(d).
55. Id. § 761.75(c). Additional provisions regulate matters such as temporary storage of PCBs
that have been designated for disposal. Id. § 761.65 (storage for disposal); id. § 761.180 (records and
monitoring). Neither industry nor environmental groups sought judicial review of the disposal rule.
See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1269 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
56. TSCA § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 2617.
57. TSCA § 18(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1).
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istrator has issued a testing rule for a chemical under section 4, no state or local
government may require testing of that chemical for similar purposes. 58 Second,
with the express exception of disposal requirements described in section 6(a)(6),
once a rule or order is prescribed by the Administrator under section 5
(premanufacturing notices) or section 6 (regulation), a state or locality may not
impose a requirement for that substance that is designed to protect against the
same risk. Such preemption, however, does not occur if the state or local re-
quirement is identical to the federal requirement, is adopted under the auspices
of another federal statute, or prohibits the use of the substance in that territorial
jurisdiction.59
In the event a state or local requirement is preempted by section 18, the
affected government can apply for an exemption from federal preemption. The
Administrator may grant the exemption if the state or local requirement would
not cause violations of certain requirements prescribed under TSCA, provides a
significantly higher degree of protection than exists under TSCA, and does not
unduly burden interstate commerce.60
Section 18, however, does not expressly preempt state or local disposal re-
quirements for a particular chemical on the issuance of a federal disposal rule
under section 6(a)(6) for that substance. 6 1 Section 6(a)(6), moreover, states that
federal disposal rules "may not require any person to take any action which
would be in violation of any law or requirement" of any state or local
government.
62
II. THE ERRATIC COURSE OF INTERPRETATION
A. EPA's Approach
When the original PCB disposal rule was promulgated in 1978, the EPA
maintained that state requirements governing PCB disposal were entirely ex-
empt from preemption as long as those requirements were not less stringent than
those prescribed by the EPA.63 The agency elaborated on the reasoning that led
to this conclusion in the Support Document that accompanied the PCB disposal
rule.
64
The Support Document indicated that section 18 gives preemptive effect to
all federal rules issued under section 6 except for disposal rules issued under
section 6(a)(6). 65 The PCB disposal rule, however, was promulgated under sec-
tion 6(e),66 which-without reference to 6(a)(6)--ordered EPA to prescribe dis-
58. TSCA § 18(a)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(A).
59. TSCA § 18(a)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B).
60. TSCA § 18(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2617(b).
61. TSCA § 18(a)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B).
62. TSCA § 6(a)(6)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(6)(B).
63. EPA Disposal and Marking Rule for PCBs, 43 Fed. Reg. 7150, 7153 (1978). Logically, this
statement also would apply to local requirements for PCB disposal.
64. See EPA, PCB Marking and Disposal Regulations, Final Action-Support Document (un-
dated) (copy on file in North Carolina Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as Support Document],
65. Id. at 39-42.
66. 43 Fed. Reg. 7150 (1978).
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posal methods for PCBs.67 As a matter of literal interpretation, one could assert
that the PCB disposal rule generally would preempt state law under section 18.
The EPA rejected such a literal approach. Instead, the agency determined
that in enacting TSCA Congress intended to recognize the "inherent interests"
of state and local governments in the disposal of toxic chemicals. 68 The EPA
perceived this congressional intent so clearly that it read section 6(e) as incorpo-
rating by implication the same limitations on federal preemption that would ap-
ply to any section 6(a)(6) disposal rule.69 Consequently, although section 18
preemption does not apply to the PCB disposal rule, the EPA viewed the refer-
ence to state and local requirements in section 6(a)(6) as applicable: the federal
PCB disposal rule may not require anyone to violate state or local law. The
agency, nevertheless, did not believe that this language protected all state dispo-
sal restrictions from federal preemption. The agency therefore declared that
state restrictions less stringent than those contained in the federal rule were pre-
empted since Congress only intended to allow states to establish more stringent
disposal requirements.
70
The extreme naivete of part of the agency's original position soon became
apparent. Thus, when the disposal rule was amended and republished in May
1979, the EPA announced in the preamble that it was reconsidering the advisa-
bility of its broad declaration that states had an unconditional right to set stan-
dards more restrictive than federal standards. It expressed concern that actions
by state and local governments to prohibit the disposal of PCBs would obstruct
the national policy of safely disposing of toxic waste:
71
While EPA has always believed that States should have the right to set
pollution control standards more restrictive than the Federal stan-
dards, it would be a matter of national concern if this principle were to
become the basis for refusal by States to share in the national responsi-
bility for finding safe means for the proper disposal of hazardous
substances.
72
The EPA stopped short of revising its prior policy pronouncement, however,
and instead declared that the issue would be considered further at another
time.
73
Later in 1979, Michigan requested an opinion from the EPA on which por-
tions of the Michigan statute and regulations governing PCBs74 were preempted
by the federal PCB disposal rule.75 The EPA did not address the question of
67. TSCA § 6(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1); see Support Document, supra note 64, at 40.
68. Support Document, supra note 64, at 40.
69. Id. at 40-41.
70. Id. at 41-42.
71. 44 Fed. Reg. 31514, 31528 (1979).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.351-.360 (West 1984); MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 299.3301-
.3319 (1979).
75. See Letter from D. Bickart, Deputy General Counsel of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, to Howard Tanner, Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
1 (Nov. 7, 1979) (copy on file in North Carolina Law Review office).
1985]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
state disposal bans in its response since Michigan had not attempted to prohibit
disposal. 76 The Agency, however, took the occasion to distinguish between the
preemptive effect of the federal disposal rule on state disposal standards and the
effect on state standards controlling the storage of PCBs designated for disposal.
The EPA's position was that, unlike the state's disposal standards, the Michigan
standards pertaining to storage of PCBs designated for disposal were preempted
expressly under section 18.77 Arguably, the EPA was trying to limit possible
damage to the federal PCB disposal program by removing storage from the pre-
emption scheme for disposal. Thus, the portion of the federal disposal rule gov-
erning temporary storage prior to disposal would have more preemptive effect
than the rest of the disposal rule.
It is impossible to justify this interpretation because the EPA's only statu-
tory authority to regulate the storage of PCBs prior to disposal is the authority
that arises as an incident of disposal. 78 Because the EPA chose to regulate this
type of storage pursuant to its authority to prescribe the PCB disposal rule,
79
both the disposal and storage standards contained in that rule should be given
the same preemptive effect.
The EPA finally addressed the issue of PCB disposal bans in a March 1980
unpublished memorandum from the Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and
Toxic Substances.80 The memorandum noted that several local ordinances ban-
ning the disposal of all PCBs had been enacted since the agency had expressed
its concern about such bans in the preamble to the amended disposal rule in May
1979.81 These bans were aggravating a serious shortage in the availability of
PCB disposal facilities. 82 No PCB incinerators had been approved for general
use when the memorandum was written; moreover, fewer than a dozen states
had approved PCB landfills within their borders.8 3 Consequently, the ordi-
nances "threaten[ed] to impede substantially, if not totally frustrate, the national
PCB disposal program established by the PCB regulation. In fact, the ordi-
nances [were] specifically designed to curtail further the limited number of EPA-
approved disposal facilities."
'84
According to the EPA, Congress could not have intended for section
6(a)(6)(B) to be read so broadly that it would frustrate the PCB disposal pro-
76. Id. at 1-9.
77. Id. at 8 (analysis of Michigan Department of Natural Resources rule on storage of PCBs
intended for disposal, MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 299.3315 (1979)).
78. See TSCA § 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e).
79. The storage-for-disposal regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 761.65 (1984), were promulgated pursu-
ant to § 6(e)(1) of TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (e)(1), which authorizes disposal and marking rules for
PCBs. 43 Fed. Reg. 7150 (1978).
80. Memorandum from S. Jellinek, Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Sub-
stances, United States Environmental Protection Agency, to Regional Administrators: State and
County Ordinances Banning PCB Disposal I (March 24, 1980) (copy on file in North Carolina Law
Review office) [hereinafter cited as Jellinek Memorandum].
81. Id.





gram that Congress mandated in section 6(e).85 Rather, the EPA contended
that Congress had intended to permit state and local governments to impose
tighter disposal restrictions "if specific local geological or other physical condi-
tions dictate variations from general, federally imposed requirements."' 86 Those
requirements "must be practically attainable, and they must not have been en-
acted to prevent entirely the disposal of PCBs in an area."
'87
In view of this interpretation, the EPA announced that it would continue to
issue approvals to PCB landfills and incinerators satisfying federal standards re-
gardless of any applicable state or local bans. The agency nonetheless indicated
that it welcomed comments from state and local governments concerning local
geological and other physical conditions that might necessitate special restric-
tions. If appropriate for safety purposes, the EPA would consider imposing
more stringent disposal restrictions in its approval of specific disposal facilities.
88
The EPA, however, went too far in declaring that all disposal bans are per
se void. The legislative history of TSCA89 reveals that Congress sought to elimi-
nate the hazards associated with indiscriminate disposal of PCBs by requiring
the Administrator of the EPA to prescribe safe disposal methods.90 If routinely
given effect, enactment of PCB disposal bans by state or local governments
would obstruct this congressional design by severely constricting the availability
of safe disposal sites.9 1 Nevertheless, some locales inherently may be so ill-
suited for safe PCB disposal that peculiar geological or other physical conditions
would justify total prohibitions on PCB disposal. The EPA should have recog-
nized this possibility and acknowledged that disposal prohibitions in those in-
stances would not frustrate the goal of safe disposal. Such bans, however,
deserve close scrutiny to determine whether unique local conditions that justify
a ban actually exist.
92
Contrary to the EPA's position, such scrutiny is not necessary for all state
or local requirements that are more stringent than federal standards. By exclud-
ing disposal rules from express preemption, Congress gave states and localities
the right to impose more stringent requirements. As long as those restrictions
do not impede realization of the goal of safe disposal, close scrutiny of special
local conditions is neither necessary nor appropriate. 93 On the other hand, more
stringent requirements that in practice are not attainable amount to constructive
bans. Such constructive bans should undergo the same scrutiny that actual bans
receive to determine if the restrictions are justified.
94
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2-3.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id.
89. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE Toxic SuBSTANcEs CONTROL ACT (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
90. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
92. See infra text accompanying note 274.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 266-67 & 274.
94. See infra text accompanying note 274.
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B. Judicial Construction and Misconstruction
The various judicial approaches to this question reveal tremendous confu-
sion over the scope and application of federal preemption to state and local regu-
lation of PCB disposal. The five courts that have analyzed the question have
done so in a multitude of conflicting ways, reaching radically different results.
City of Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co.95 was the first case to
address the issue. Hartford Electric Light Company (HELCO) planned to in-
cinerate mineral oil contaminated with PCBs in a high efficiency boiler located
at its electric generating station in Middletown, Connecticut. 96 The city sought
to enjoin the incineration, 97 claiming that HELCO had failed to obtain a state
permit for the disposal of PCBs.9 8
The court examined whether the EPA rule governing PCB disposal had
preempted the Connecticut statute,99 which required a state-issued permit. The
court recognized that state requirements concerning a particular chemical are
preempted expressly once rules or orders for that chemical are promulgated by
the EPA under sections 5 or 6 of TSCA, except for disposal rules issued under
section 6(a)(6). Since the Administrator had issued the final PCB disposal rule,
a crucial issue was whether that rule constituted a section 6(a)(6) disposal rule.
If so, the express preemption language of section 18(a)(2) would not apply.1t°
95. No. 33133 (Super. Ct. Middlesex Jud. Dist. Conn. Jan. 22, 1981), aff'd on other grounds,
473 A.2d 787 (Conn. 1984).
96. HELCO intended to burn annually approximately 30,000 gallons of PCB-contaminated
mineral oil. HELCO's plan was to transport the mineral oil to the Middletown generating station
from other HELCO facilities where the material had been used as insulating fluid in electrical trans-
formers and switch gears. The mineral oil then would have been used as fuel oil in one of HELCO's
boilers. City of Middletown v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 473 A.2d 787, 788 (Conn. 1984).
97. City of Middletown, slip op. at 2. Soon after the suit was filed, the EPA approved HELCO's
plan pursuant to TSCA. EPA, 5 Bimonthly Report on PCB Activities and Policies, Table 1 (March
3, 1982).
98. City of Middletown v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 473 A.2d 787, 789 (Conn. 1984). The
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, however, had informally approved the incin-
eration plan. City of Middletown, slip op. at 14.
The complaint also alleged that the incineration of PCBs by HELCO would constitute a tres-
pass and would violate both local zoning restrictions and local wetland regulations, id. at 10, and
that HELCO had neglected to obtain a state certificate of environmental compatibility for the modi-
fication of a power generating facility. See id. at 11. The court dismissed these four claims without
any discussion of federal preemption. Id. at 20-21, 32-34.
Furthermore, the city charged that HELCO's plan violated the Connecticut Environmental
Protection Act and that HELCO had failed to obtain a Connecticut solid waste facility permit, air
pollution permit, water pollution permit, toxic waste disposal permit, and hazardous waste permit.
City of Middletown v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 473 A.2d 787, 789, 791 (Conn. 1984). Those claims
were dismissed on the basis of federal preemption as well as on other grounds. City of Middletown,
slip op. at 28-3 1; City of Middletown v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 473 A.2d 787, 792 (Conn. 1984).
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-467 (West Supp. 1982) (formerly CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-54vv (West Supp. 1981)) provides:
No person. . . shall dispose of the compound PCB or any item, product or material con-
taining the compound PCB by any means other than a means approved by the commis-
sioner [of environmental protection] which will result in the destruction of the compound
PCB except in accordance with a permit issued by the commissioner under the provisions
of sections 22a-208, 22a-430, or 22a-454.
The Commissioner had not adopted any implementing regulations as of the date of the decision.
City of Middletown, slip op. at 26.
100. See id. at 24-25.
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In answering this question, the City of Middletown court reasoned that sec-
tion 6(a)(6) authorized the issuance of disposal rules only upon a finding by the
Administrator that a particular chemical presented an unreasonable risk: a find-
ing that lies in the Administrator's discretion. On the other hand, in section 6(e)
Congress mandated the promulgation of the PCB disposal rule; thus, the Ad-
ministrator had no discretion in deciding whether to regulate the disposal of
PCBs.10 1 The court concluded that this difference indicated that Congress did
not intend the PCB disposal rule to be subject to the exclusion from section 18
preemption applicable to section 6(a)(6) disposal rules. 10 2 Apparently, the court
thought that the explicit congressional command to regulate PCB disposal
would be frustrated if those regulations were not given express preemptive effect
under section 18(a)(2).
103
The court's analysis and conclusion were misguided. As the EPA had rec-
ognized, 1' 4 in enacting TSCA Congress wanted to protect the strong interests of
states and localities concerning the disposal of toxic chemicals within their juris-
dictions. Consequently, Congress excluded disposal rules from the ambit of sec-
tion 18 preemption. Although Congress did not specifically exclude the
provision mandating the PCB disposal rule from section 18 preemption, the rule
imposed the same types of disposal requirements described in section 6(a)(6)
that were excluded. Moreover, the legislative history reveals no congressional
intent to treat the preemption of state and local PCB disposal restrictions differ-
ently from other disposal restrictions. Congress' failure to refer to the PCB dis-
posal rule in drafting the exclusion from express preemption is not sufficient
reason to ignore the otherwise clear expression of congressional intent,10 5 as the
City of Middletown court did. 106
101. Id. at 25.
102. Id. at 25-26.
103. See id. at 25. The court also dismissed this claim for lack of standing. Id. at 28-31.
104. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 210-53 and accompanying text.
106. Having reached the wrong conclusion, the court incorrectly analyzed the question as one of
express preemption under § 18. In doing so, the court compounded the problem by misconstruing,
at least in part, the scope of § 18's express preemption. Although the express preemption provided
by § 18(a)(2)(B) does not apply to the federal PCB disposal rule, an examination of the court's
application of that subsection is necessary because § 18(a)(2)(B) gives express preemptive effect to
other federal rules and orders issued under §§ 5 and 6 and because some courts may err and apply it
in the case of the PCB disposal rule.
The court found that none of the enumerated exceptions to preemption provided in
§ 18(a)(2)(B) applied. The state disposal provision was not identical to the federal rule; the provision
was not adopted under the authority of federal law; and it did not prohibit the use of PCBs. City of
Middletown, slip op. at 26-27. In addition, the State had not applied to the Administrator of the
EPA for an exemption from preemption pursuant to § 18(b). Consequently, the court held that the
state statute was preempted on the date the federal disposal rule became effective. Id. at 27.
The court, without elaboration, also held that § 18(a)(2)(B) preemption prevented it from exer-
cising jurisdiction over PCB disposal pursuant to "any other state environmental statute." Id. at 28.
Thus, the court held that the city could not proceed against HELCO for "unreasonable pollution"
under the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act or challenge the failure to obtain permits
under other state environmental statutes. Id.
It is not clear, however, that the court even had to address whether § 18(a)(2)(B) preempted
those other state statutes. In dismissing the cause of action predicated on trespass, the court stated
that the evidence had failed "to establish that any ascertainable amount of pollutants will be pro-
duced as a result of the proposed burning program of [HELCO]." Id. at 32. The state supreme
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A federal district court in SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton10 7 also found that
section 18 controlled the preemption of state and local restrictions on PCB dis-
posal. 108 The court's logic, however, differed radically from the reasoning of the
Connecticut court. The controversy involved SED's operation of a Dayton,
Ohio warehouse in which PCBs were stored.109 Possibly in reaction to SED's
operation, the Dayton City Commission enacted several ordinances prohibiting
the storage of PCBs within the city limits.110 SED brought suit primarily seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that the ordinances were invalid because TSCA had
preempted local regulation pertaining to the storage of PCBs. I t I
In opposing SED's motion for summary judgment, the city argued1 12 that
its ordinances were not preempted expressly by section 18 because the city's ban
court therefore affirmed the dismissal for "factual insufficiency" of the count alleging a violation of
the state Environmental Protection Act. City of Middletown v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 473 A.2d
787, 792 (Conn. 1984). For the same reason, the other state environmental permitting statutes may
not have applied to HELCO's incineration plan.
Even if one or more of these permitting statutes were implicated by the incineration plan, the
court's broad conclusion regarding preemption was rash. For example, if the plan would have re-
sulted in the discharge of water pollutants, a state water pollution permit probably would have been
required by state law. That statute could fall within the § 18(a)(2)(B)(ii) exception to preemption for
state laws adopted under the authority of any other federal law. Congress intended this exception to
apply to state and local requirements adopted under either the authority of other federal law or state
or local authority that had been expressly preserved by federal law. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 89, at 407, 461. Consequently, the state's authority to regulate the discharge of water pollu-
tants, if preserved by the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982), would not be preempted
by TSCA. Section 510 of the Clean Water Act expressly preserves the authority of states to impose
standards that equal or exceed federal requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982).
Finally, the cause of action available under the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act for"unreasonable pollution" was not preempted by TSCA. The Connecticut Act simply grants stand-
ing to all persons who seek to protect the state's environment through declaratory and injunctive
relief. Such a general remedy is not a regulatory requirement that is applicable to PCBs in the
context of§ 18 and, therefore, is not preempted expressly by § 18. See also infra note 137 (§ 18 only
preempts certain state regulatory requirements).
107. 519 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
108. Id. at 987-88.
109. Id. at 981.
110. Id. The prohibition was enforceable through civil and criminal penalties. In addition, the
ordinances declared that storage of PCBs in the city constituted a public nuisance for which the city
attorney was authorized to file an action seeking injunctive relief. DAYTON, OHIO, REV. CODE OF
GEN. ORDINANCES, §§ 97.01-.09, 97.97-.99 (1980).
111. SED, 519 F. Supp. at 981. SED also sought a preliminary injunction to restrain the city
from prosecuting a nuisance action in state court. SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 515 F. Supp. 737,
738-39 (S.D. Ohio 1981). SED's fears were well justified. Shortly after the case was filed, the city
initiated an action against SED requesting over two million dollars in damages and an injunction
based on public nuisance. See id. at 740. SED's motion for a preliminary injunction, however, was
denied on the basis of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982), which prohibits a federal
court from enjoining proceedings in a state court except as authorized by Congress, or when neces-
sary to protect its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment. Id. at 743. The court then
ordered SED to file a motion for summary judgment on the preemption issue. Id. at 744.
112. The city also asserted that TCSA's preemption provision was unconstitutional to the extent
that it infringed on the power of local governments to act in local matters of safety, health, and land
use-powers that traditionally have rested in the exclusive jurisdiction of states and their political
subdivisions. In support of this proposition, the city relied on National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976). SED, 519 F. Supp. at 982. In National League of Cities the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a federal statute that would have extended minimum wage and maximum
hours regulation to nearly all employees of state and local governments. The Court stressed notions
of state sovereignty and concluded that this kind of federal regulation would interfere with the em-
ployment decisions of these governments in discharging their duties to administer law and provide
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on storage fell within the exclusion from express preemption for local restric-
tions on the disposal of toxic waste.113 According to the city, the storage of
PCBs for disposal constituted "disposal" for purposes of TSCA.
114
The court accepted the city's proposition. In doing so, it noted that because
TSCA does not expressly define "disposal," the court must look to EPA's PCB
disposal rule. That rule defines "disposal" to include "actions related to con-
taining, transporting, destroying, degrading, decontaminating, or confining
PCBs and PCB Items." 115 The court found that this definition was comprehen-
sive enough to include "any activity after the last use" of the PCB that was
related to its ultimate disposition. 116 Such activities necessarily would include
storage prior to disposal.
11 7
A second issue still remained: Was the exclusion from express preemption
for section 6(a)(6) disposal rules applicable as well to the PCB disposal rule
promulgated under section 6(e)? Referring to the language of section
18(a)(2)(B), the court determined that the federal PCB disposal rule imposed
disposal requirements similar to those described in section 6(a)(6). 118 Conse-
quently, the court should have concluded that the city's storage ban was not
preempted expressly under section 18 and then should have explored the ques-
tion of implied preemption.
The SED court, however, did not follow that line of analysis.' 19 Instead,
the court devised a unique analysis of section 18 and concluded that the express
public services. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842-52. Thus, Congress had displaced uncon-
stitutionally the states' freedom to shape the form of their own "integral operations." Id. at 852.
The court in SED concluded that the express preemption provision in TCSA was not unconsti-
tutional by distinguishing National League of Cities based on Justice Blackmun's concurrence. SED,
519 F. Supp. at 983-84. Justice Blackmun's opinion emphasized that the Court's holding "does not
outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demon-
strably greater." National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856. Because Justice Blackmun was the
swing vote in the five-to-four decision in National League of Cities, the court in SED believed that
his opinion limited the implications that could be drawn from the broad language in the Court's
plurality opinion. SED, 519 F. Supp. at 983-84.
By a five-to-four vote the Supreme Court subsequently overruled National League of Cities in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 53 U.S.L.W. 4135, 4143 (Feb. 19, 1985).
Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion. The Garcia Court held that "a rule of state immunity
from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental func-
tion is 'integral' or 'traditional,'" was "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice." Garcia,
53 U.S.L.W. at 4140.
113. SED, 519 F. Supp. at 984.
114. Id. at 985.
115. 40 C.F.R. § 761.3 (1984).
116. SED, 517 F. Supp. at 985 n.5.
117. Id. The court's conclusion on this point, which differed from the position taken by the
EPA, was correct. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
118. SED, 519 F. Supp. at 986-87. This conclusion is consistent with the EPA's interpretation
that § 6(a)(6) implicitly is incorporated into § 6(e). Support Document, supra note 64, at 40-41.
119. The court rejected the EPA's initial position, see supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text,
that state and local requirements respecting PCB disposal are not preempted as long as those re-
quirements are more stringent than the federal rule. SED, 519 F. Supp. at 985-86. The court was
dissatisfied with the agency's interpretation because it could find no literal statutory language sup-
porting preemption of less restrictive state and local disposal requirements. Despite the limited na-
ture of its dissatisfaction with the EPA's position, the court spurned the agency's interpretation in
full-including the view that express preemption under § 18(a)(2)(B) simply does not govern the
question of federal preemption of state and local disposal requirements. Id. at 986.
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preemption provided by section 18 was, nonetheless, applicable to the storage
ban. The court interpreted section 18(a)(2)(B) as being comprised of three sepa-
rate parts. According to the court, the first part merely describes the adminis-
trative action that triggers express preemption: a rule or order prescribed under
section 5 or section 6 for a chemical but not a rule imposing section 6(a)(6)
disposal requirements. The second part of the subsection then defines the scope
of express preemption: "'[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may...
establish or continue in effect, any requirement which is applicable to such sub-
stance or mixture .. ' "120 The last part provides the three exceptions to
express preemption for identical requirements, requirements adopted under
other federal law, or prohibitions of certain uses.
12 1
According to the court's interpretation, if the EPA had only promulgated
the PCB disposal rule, express preemption would not have been "triggered."
Since EPA also had promulgated other section 6 rules for the manufacture and
use of PCBs, however, express preemption had been triggered, subject only to
the three enumerated exceptions found in the last part of section 18(a)(2)(B).1
22
The court noted that if Congress had desired to create an exception for PCB
disposal requirements, it would have described the scope of express preemption
in the second portion of section 18(a)(2)(B) in terms of activities as well as sub-
stances.1 23 Moreover, since Congress could have added disposal requirements
as a fourth enumerated exception to express preemption 124 but did not, the ap-
plication of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius suggested that local
disposal requirements were not excepted from express preemption once section
18 preemption had been triggered.125
This interpretation directly contradicted Congress' intent. TSCA was
designed to give states and localities more latitude in regulating disposal. 126 The
SED court construed out of existence the language in sections 18(a)(2)(B) and
6(a)(6)(B) that exclude state and local disposal requirements from express
preemption. 127
120. SED, 519 F. Supp. at 987 (quoting TSCA § 18(a)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 987-88. The SED court noted that Congress could have included language that pro-
vided: "'[N]o State. . .may. . . establish. . . any requirement prohibiting or regulating manu-
facturing, processing, or distribution in commerce, which is applicable to such substance.'" Id. at
988 n.6.
124. Id. at 987-88.
125. Id. at 988 n.7.
126. See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
127. After incorrectly holding that § 18(a)(2)(B) express preemption was applicable, the court
addressed the city's claim that the ordinances were exempt from express preemption by virtue of
§ 18(a)(2)(B)(ii) because they had been adopted under the authority of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). The city argued that the ordinances were authorized by the Clean
Water Act since they restricted the addition of pollutants to waters of the United States. SED, 519
F. Supp. at 988-89. Although SED did not plan to discharge PCBs, such a discharge was a possibil-
ity, albeit remote, whether by accident or an act of God. Thus, according to the court, the ordi-
nances restricted "potential accidental 'discharges' under the terms of the [Clean Water Act]." Id.
at 989.
The court recognized that it would create a" 'gaping hole' in the express preemption otherwise
provided by [§ 18(a)(2)(B)]" if it accepted the city's argument. Id. Local governments could claim
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that virtually all local regulation concerning toxic substances furthers the purpose of the Clean
Water Act in abating water pollution in some way, however far-fetched. Under this analysis, such
actions thus would constitute "an exercise of local government power 'under authority of' the Clean
Water Act." Id. The court, nonetheless, found that this interpretation of § 18(a)(2)(B)(ii) was con-
sistent with congressional intent. Id.
Citing § 9 of TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2608, the court declared that Congress intended the EPA to
use its authority under the Act only as a "last resort" with preference given to existing controls
under other federal environmental legislation. Id. at 989-90. The court understood that the Dayton
storage ban did not directly concern § 9 since the possible duplication of federal action was not
involved. The court, however, believed that the intention to use TSCA only as a "'last resort,' in
order to not unduly disrupt the existing environmental regulatory scheme, was carried over (or
passed down) to the state level" via § 18(a)(2)(B)(ii)'s exception to preemption. Id. at 990. Thus,
state regulation, otherwise preempted, is saved from preemption provided it "serves the purposes of
other existing federal environmental legislation, even if only remotely or incidentally. ... Id.
The court concluded that the Dayton storage ban furthered an objective of the Clean Water Act
by preventing water pollution. Id. at 989-91. Furthermore, the court found that the Clean Water
Act acknowledged the right of local governments to establish water pollution requirements that were
no less stringent than federal requirements under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 990-9 1; see also supra
note 106 (§ 510 of Clean Water Act expressly preserves such right). The court, therefore, held that
§ 18(a)(2)(B)(ii) excepted the storage ban from express preemption. Id. at 991.
This Article contends that § 18(a)(2)(B) confers no express preemptive effect on the PCB dispo-
sal rule. The court in SED, however, held otherwise and then committed another error in its subse-
quent application of § 18(a)(2)(B). It is necessary to analyze this error because some courts either
may reject the thesis of this Article or may confront the problem of applying § 18(a)(2)(B) to rules or
orders that fall within that subsection's scope-for example, federal rules concerning the manufac-
ture or use of toxic substances.
The court's analysis completely misconstrued the impact of § 9 on the interpretation of
§ 18(a)(2)(B)(ii). Congress did not intend TSCA to be used only as a "last resort" for regulating
PCB disposal; it expressly ordered the Administrator of the EPA to regulate PCB disposal under the
authority of TSCA and to do so quickly. TSCA § 6(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1). Moreover, § 9
does not require the Administrator to defer to other statutory authority administered by the EPA
(such as the Clean Water Act) if the Administrator determines that "it is in the public interest to
protect against such risk [to health or the environment posed by a chemical] by action taken under
[TSCA]." TSCA § 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2608(b). The exercise of that discretion is not subject to judi-
cial review. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 698.
In enacting § 9 Congress sought to avoid duplication of effort and outright conflicts with other
federal statutory schemes by simplifying and coordinating environmental protection as much as pos-
sible. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 167, 179, 697. Nevertheless, Congress passed TSCA
to fill a need that had not been met by existing federal environmental legislation. Even though the
Clean Water Act, for example, could regulate the discharge of PCBs to waters of the United States,
no legal structure existed to control comprehensively the manufacture, use, and land disposal of
chemicals that posed a risk to health and the environment. The establishment of such control was
the overriding purpose of TSCA. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text. TSCA, therefore,
took a coordinate position among the preexisting federal environmental statutes.
In view of their coordinate positions, each federal environmental statute, including TSCA,
should be viewed as occupying the core of its respective environmental field. The extension of one
statute's authority into a field dominated by another statute might compromise the statutory scheme
that Congress intended to apply in that core area. In addition, such intrusion would complicate
effective compliance with the law. Consequently, if a local requirement were intended to regulate
water pollution and did so, then out of regard for the purposes and policies of the Clean Water Act,
that requirement should not be expressly preempted by virtue of § 18(a)(2)(B)(ii). On the other
hand, if a local requirement were not related reasonably to the purposes of the Clean Water Act,
then preemption of that requirement by TSCA would not constitute any disregard for the Clean
Water Act. So construed, § 18(a)(2)(B)(ii) furthers Congress' intent to harmonize environmental
law.
The SED court, however, did not attempt to harmonize TSCA's regulatory scheme with that of
the Clean Water Act. The court emasculated TSCA out of misplaced, erroneous deference to the
Clean Water Act. The storage of PCBs at the SED warehouse did not involve the discharge of PCBs
into waters of the United States; thus, the Clean Water Act was not applicable directly to the situa-
tion. Even if Dayton's ordinances somehow represented the exercise of a local government's author-
ity preserved by the Clean Water Act, the relationship between the ordinance and the federal statute
was strained beyond reason. Although the Dayton ordinances someday might prevent the accidental
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In Chappell v. SCA Services, Inc.128 the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois adopted a third approach in analyzing TSCA's im-
pact on the validity of state and local law governing PCB disposal. Chappell
was a class action brought on behalf of the residents of Wilsonville, Illinois. The
residents sought damages for an alleged public and private nuisance created by a
chemical waste landfill of SCA Services (SCA) located near Wilsonville. 129 The
landfill served as a repository for various chemical substances including
PCBs. 130 One issue was whether TSCA preempted a suit based on state nui-
sance law. 131
SCA removed the case to federal district court, claiming that the district
court had federal question jurisdiction because TSCA had preempted state
law.1 32 Plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court,1 33 but SCA resisted
remand, arguing that the district court possessed jurisdiction on removal as a
result of SCA's defense that TSCA had supplanted state nuisance law. 134 The
court rejected SCA's proposition for two reasons. First, a defense of federal
preemption provided no basis for removal jurisdiction because plaintiffs' claims
were premised solely on state common-law nuisance.135 Second, TSCA did not
preempt state common-law nuisance actions regardless of whether a preemption
defense conferred removal jurisdiction.
136
After a detailed discussion of how TSCA related to state law, the court
determined that the express preemptive effect that section 18 gives to certain
EPA rules promulgated under TSCA does not extend to section 6(a)(6) rules
relating to disposal of toxic chemicals. 137 According to the court, section
discharge of PCBs into waters of the United States, the likelihood of such an occurrence is remote.
The court in essence elevated local requirements only peripherally concerned with clean water above
the strong congressional interest in regulating toxic substances. Because TSCA's core area of regula-
tion was involved directly and the Clean Water Act's field of concern was implicated only tangen-
tially, if at all, the coordination of environmental regulation envisioned by Congress demanded
preemption of the storage ban.
128. 540 F. Supp. 1087 (C.D. Illinois 1982).
129. Id. at 1089. In addition to SCA, plaintiffs sued James Andrews and Earthline Corporation.
Andrews had created Earthline to operate the landfill and later sold Earthline to SCA. Plaintiffs
sought compensatory damages from SCA for personal and property damages resulting from the
maintenance of the nuisance. They also requested punitive damages from SCA on the grounds that
it had acted with "reckless indifference" to plaintiffs' safety and had misrepresented to them the
nature of the chemical wastes to be deposited at the landfill. Finally, plaintiffs sought compensatory
and punitive damages based on the allegation that all three defendants had conspired to create and
maintain the nuisance. Id. at 1089-90.
130. Id. at 1089. The landfill had been the subject of extensive prior litigation. The Village of
Wilsonville had filed suit in state court requesting injunctive relief to abate a public nuisance alleg-
edly caused by the landfill. See Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 426
N.E.2d 824, 826-27 (1981). After a lengthy trial, the trial court concluded that the landfill consti-
tuted a nuisance. Id. at 6, 426 N.E.2d at 827. The decision was affirmed on appeal. 77 Ill. App. 3d
618, 396 N.E.2d 552 (1979), aft'd, 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
131. Chappell, 540 F. Supp. at 1096.
132. Id. at 1090, 1094-95.
133. Id. at 1089.
134. See id. at 1095.
135. Id. at 1095-96. The court noted that many cases had reached a contrary conclusion. Id. at
1095 n.3.
136. Id. at 1096.
137. Id. at 1096-97. The court did not have to analyze § 18 in such depth, however, because
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6(a)(6)(B) lends additional support to this conclusion by expressly providing
that federal disposal rules may not require anyone to violate state law or require-
ments.138 The court, moreover, found its conclusion consistent with the EPA's
published interpretation 139 that state requirements governing PCB disposal were
not preempted as long as those requirements were no less stringent than the
federal rules. 140 This result contrasts sharply with SED, in which the court re-
jected the EPA's interpretation. In SED the court held that once express pre-
emption is triggered by a section 5 or a section 6 rule-other than a section
6(a)(6) disposal rule-all state and local requirements are expressly preempted,
including disposal requirements. 14 1 Recognizing this conflict with SED, the
Chappell court indicated that it would defer to the EPA's interpretation when its
interpretation was as reasonable as any other.142 The exclusion of disposal
rules from the preemption scheme contained in section 18 thus was held to be
absolute.
143
Warren County v. State of North Carolina'44 was the first decision to con-
front the consequences of a total ban on PCB disposal. The case illustrates the
conflict between local fear and the need for safe and regulated disposal sites for
PCBs. It also represents the clearest and most accurate judicial interpretation of
Congress' purposes in drafting TSCA.
During the summer of 1978, liquid wastes containing PCBs were spilled
§ 18 only preempts certain state regulatory requirements. Thus, it does not apply to state common-
law remedies.
138. Id. at 1098.
139. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
140. Chappell, 540 F. Supp. at 1098.
141. SED, 519 F. Supp. at 986-88. This conclusion in Chappell also conflicts with the decision in
City of Middletown, slip. op. at 24-26.
142. Chappell, 540 F. Supp. at 1098.
143. See id. The court also looked to the citizen suit provision of TSCA for guidance in deter-
mining that TSCA does not preempt state common-law nuisance actions. Id. at 1098-1100. The
citizen suit provision grants standing to "any person" who commences a suit in federal district court
seeking to restrain violations of TSCA and its regulations and to compel the Administrator to per-
form mandatory duties under the Act. TSCA § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a). The provision also
states in a subsection commonly known as the "savings clause" that it does not restrict any right a
person might have to seek enforcement of TSCA or other relief under any other statute or under the
common law. TSCA § 20(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(3). A straightforward reading of the citizen
suit provision, therefore, indicates that state common-law remedies are available unless preempted
by another provision of TSCA. Because such preemption is not otherwise prescribed by the Act, the
court ruled that TSCA did not preclude suits seeking damages for state common-law nuisance. See
Chappell, 540 F. Supp. at 1099-1100.
In doing so, the court found that the Supreme Court's decision in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304 (1981), did not compel a different result. Chappell, 540 F. Supp. at 1099. In Milwaukee
the State of Illinois had sued the city of Milwaukee, under the federal common law of nuisance, to
abate interstate water pollution. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 308-10. Despite a "savings clause" in the
Clean Water Act similar to TSCA's, the Supreme Court held that the regulatory program estab-
lished by the Clean Water Act was so comprehensive that it had supplanted the need for a federal
common law of nuisance. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317. The Chappell court found that holding
inapposite to the Chappell facts. Chappell, 540 F. Supp. at 1099. First, although the "savings
clause" of the Clean Water Act meant that the citizen suit provision did not revoke the federal
common law of nuisance, the other provisions of that Act did supplant it. In Chappell, however, the
other provisions of TSCA did not preempt this state cause of action. See id. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court's decision was limited solely to whether a federal statute had preempted federal
common law; it did not address the availability of relief under state common law. Id.
144. 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
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illegally along approximately 210 miles of highway in North Carolina. After
conducting an investigation which determined that the soil along those highways
contained high concentrations of PCBs, the State of North Carolina prepared a
plan for the collection and disposal of the contaminated soil in a landfill. The
State chose a site in Warren County and submitted an application to the Re-
gional Administrator of the EPA for approval of the landfill pursuant to
TSCA.14 5 The EPA convened a public hearing in Warren County following
receipt of the application. Oral comments were made and addressed, and writ-
ten comments were accepted. After the State submitted further data, the EPA
approved the conceptual design for the landfill in June 1979.146
Warren County instituted suit in state court to enjoin North Carolina and
the owners of the landfill site from using the site for PCB disposal.' 47 The
county argued that the landfill would violate a county ordinance banning the
disposal of PCBs in Warren County.' 48 The state court issued a preliminary
injunction restraining PCB disposal at the proposed site,149 and the case was
removed to federal district court' 50 after the Regional Administrator of the
EPA was added as a defendant.
15 1
In ruling on defendants' motions for summary judgment, 5 2 the district
court addressed the validity of the county ordinance.15 3 The county contended
that its ordinance was not preempted by TSCA by virtue of section 6(a)(6)(B),
which states that federal disposal rules may not require anyone to act in viola-
tion of any state or local law or requirement.' 54 The county also asserted that
section 18(a)(2)(B)(ii) expressly authorized it to prohibit the use of PCBs.155
The county's arguments were contradictory. If section 6(a)(6)(B) applied
145. Id. at 281.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 280. A number of state officials also were named as defendants. Id.
148. Id. The county also challenged the landfill on the basis of nuisance, failure to prepare a
state Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), the propriety of the State's choice of the landfill site,
and the EPA's approval of it. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The complaint was amended at that time to add a claim grounded on the EPA's failure
to prepare a federal EIS. Id.
152. Id. at 280-81.
153. Id. at 288-90. The ordinance provided:
WHEREAS, polychlorinated biphenyls, (hereinafter referred to as PCB's) are highly toxic
substances, which are imminently dangerous to human health and life and are widely dis-
tributed in the environment; and...
WHEREAS, Warren County is peculiarly unsuited for the disposition of PCB's because
there is a generally high ground water table in the county and most of the soils of the
county are highly permeable, so that there is a substantial likelihood that if stored or dis-
posed of in the county, PCB's would eventually seep into the ground water supply, where
they would constitute an extreme danger to human health and life;...
BE IT NOW THEREFORE enacted and ordained by the County of Warren that. ..
No PCB's, or substances or materials containing a measurable amount (other than a trace)
of PCB's shall be stored, dumped, or otherwise disposed of within the boundaries of War-
ren County.
Warren County, N.C., Ordinance Prohibiting the Storage and Disposal of PCB's (Aug. 21, 1978).
154. Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 288.
155. See id. at 288-89.
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to the EPA's disposal rule, the express preemption of section 18 would not ap-
ply. Moreover, even assuming that section 18 applied, the exception to express
preemption for use bans15 6 could not sanction a disposal ban. The statute
clearly distinguishes between rules relating to the use of a chemical and rules
governing disposal of the chemical. 157 The court, however, discussed neither
the inherent contradiction of plaintiff's argument nor the inapplicability of the
section 18(a)(2)(B)(ii) exception.
158
Instead, the court apparently assumed that local PCB disposal rules were
not preempted expressly by section 18 and were authorized, to a certain extent,
by section 6(a)(6)(B). 159 According to the court, Congress intended state and
local governments to retain "some leeway to impose more stringent disposal re-
quirements than those provided for by federal regulation."'16 The question,
however, was whether "Congress intended to confer upon counties and other
local governments the authority to totally frustrate the PCB disposal program
through the implementation of total disposal bans."'
16 1
To answer this question the Warren County court reviewed the EPA's posi-
tion presented in the preamble to the May 1979 revised PCB disposal rule. 162 In
that rulemaking, the EPA expressed its concern that PCB disposal prohibitions
could impede the national goal of safely disposing of PCBs. 163 Apparently, the
Jellinek Memorandum of March 1980164 also was consulted, for the court char-
acterized the EPA's interpretation of TSCA as authorizing only state and local
disposal requirements that were consistent with national objectives. 165 In other
words, TSCA does not preempt local requirements "reasonably dictated by local
[geological] or other physical conditions."'
166
After reviewing this material, the court held that the supremacy clause of
the Constitution prohibited a county from enacting an ordinance that totally
frustrated a congressionally legislated plan to protect the nation. 167 Recogniz-
ing the impact that upholding such a local ban would have, the court noted:
Were the Court to approve this ordinance, no doubt the other ninety-
nine counties in North Carolina would quickly enact identical bans.
What, then, would North Carolina do with the PCB laced soil? Surely
our neighbors in Virginia and Tennessee, South Carolina and Georgia
156. TSCA § 18(a)(2)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B)(ii).
157. Compare TSCA § 6(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(5) (authorizing rules for the commercial use
of chemical substances) and TSCA § 6(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2) (mandating rules applicable to
the use of PCBs) with TSCA § 6(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(6) (authorizing rules for the disposal of
chemical substances) and TSCA § 6(e)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A) (mandating rules for the
disposal of PCBs).
158. See Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 288-90.
159. See id. at 288-89.
160. Id. at 289.
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
163. Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 289.
164. Jellinek Memorandum, supra note 80.
165. Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 289.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 289-90.
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would also object to our carrying such wastes into their states.168
Consequently, the court held the ordinance void "as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress under
the Toxic Substances Control Act. ..."169
The court reached the correct result, and its analysis, for the most part, was
perceptive, but it adhered too closely to the EPA's position 17° that all disposal
bans necessarily are void. A few locations in the United States may be inappro-
priate for safe PCB disposal because of unique local geographic or physical con-
ditions; in those settings a local ban to guarantee safe disposal is justified. 17 t
Recognizing that many, but not necessarily all, disposal bans frustrate
TSCA would not have affected the court's holding that the ordinance in question
was void. In Warren County the county failed to prove that a ban was necessary
as a matter of safety. Unsupported conclusions recited in the ordinance regard-
ing high groundwater and permeable soil conditions did not constitute an ade-
quate showing; every other county in North Carolina easily could do likewise.
Moreover, the county failed to demonstrate that EPA's approval of the landfill
site was arbitrary or capricious on scientific and technical grounds.' 72 Conse-
quently, Warren County's ordinance hindered safe PCB disposal insofar as it
bore no relation to special local conditions that would have justified a ban.
The dispute over the effect of the federal PCB disposal rule on state law
surfaced most recently in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Broadwater.
17 3
Chemical Waste Management (CWM) operates a chemical waste landfill near
Emelle, Alabama, which has been approved by the EPA for the disposal of
PCBs.' 74 In January 1984 the EPA began an administrative action against
CWM alleging that it had violated regulations governing PCB storage 17 5 by fail-
ing to remove certain PCBs from storage and dispose of them within the requi-
168. Id. at 290.
169. Id. The court dismissed as moot the action against the landowners and the Treasurer of
North Carolina because the State already had purchased the landfill site. Id. at 280 n.4. In addition,
the court granted summary judgment for the State and the EPA on all other counts of the complaint.
Id. at 296.
In Twitty v. North Carolina, 527 F. Supp. 778 (E.D.N.C. 1981), aff'd, 696 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.
1982), three Warren County citizens who owned land adjacent to the disposal site also sued the State
and the EPA seeking to enjoin use of the site for PCB disposal. They alleged, in part, that the
disposal of PCBs would violate the Warren County ordinance. Id. at 780. On the same day that the
district court rendered its decision in Warren County, the same court granted summary judgment for
defendants in Twitty, holding that the ordinance was preempted by TSCA. See id. at 781.
170. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92. Since disposal bans could frustrate the national
goal of safe disposal so easily, such bans should be scrutinized closely to determine if some unique
local condition justifies the ban. See infra text accompanying note 274.
172. Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 287-88.
173. No. CV 84-G-1208-W (N.D. Ala. May 24, 1984) (mem. to order granting preliminary in-
junction), order modified in part, (Sept. 17, 1984) (order granting modification of preliminary in-
junction), appeal dismissed as moot, 758 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1985).
174. Id. at 1, 7.




site time period. 176 The EPA and CWM subsequently entered into a consent
agreement that set forth a schedule for the disposal of those PCBs. The agree-
ment also stipulated penalties for noncompliance. 177 The Alabama Department
of Environmental Management (ADEM) apparently was not pleased by the
terms of that agreement.
Three months after the consent agreement was signed, ADEM issued its
own order against CWM based on violations of state regulations 178 that essen-
tially incorporated the TSCA storage requirements. 179 The state order required
CWM to submit a plan for the disposal of all PCB articles and containers stored
at its facility, file progress reports on its disposal plan, and cease receiving any
additional PCBs at its Emelle facility until it had complied with the storage
rule.'8 0 The order thus prohibited, at least temporarily, the disposal of further
PCBs at the landfill.
CWM filed suit to overturn the state order' 8' and also sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent its enforcement. 182 In support of its request for prelimi-
nary relief, CWM argued that the state order was preempted by the federal dis-
posal rule promulgated under TSCA.18 3 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama issued the preliminary injunction, finding that
CWM likely would prevail on the merits of its preemption argument.'
8 4
Notwithstanding congressional intent,185 the agency's interpretation,'
8 6
and the analysis of three other federal courts,' 8 7 the court held that the PCB
disposal rule, unlike section 6(a)(6) disposal rules, was not excluded from section
176. In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., TSCA Docket No. 84-H-03, at 2 (EPA March
23, 1984) (consent agreement and compliance schedule).
177. Id. at 4-10. Before a consent agreement will dispose of an administrative proceeding, it
must be approved by the Regional Administrator (or an EPA judicial officer, 40 C.F.R. § 22.04
(1984)) in the form of a consent order. 40 C.F.R. § 22.18(c) (1984).
This particular consent agreement never was approved. After the Attorney General of Ala-
bama intervened in the administrative proceeding, the matter was referred to an administrative law
judge. In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., TSCA Docket No. 84-H-03, at 8 (EPA Dec. 19,
1984) (consent agreement and order). The EPA, CWM, and the Alabama Attorney General entered
into a new consent agreement on December 19, 1984 establishing, among other things, a schedule for
disposal, a $300,000 TSCA civil penalty, and stipulated penalties in the event of noncompliance. Id.
at 8-11, 31-33. The latest consent agreement was approved by the administrative law judge. Id. at
39.
178. Ala. Dept. of Pub. Health, Envtl. Health Admin., Div. of Solid and Hazardous Waste,
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations, § 4-235.06 (1980).
179. In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., Order No. 84-012-RW (ADEM April 16, 1984).
180. Id. at 3-5.
181. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. Broadwater, No. CV 84-G-1208-W (N.D. Ala. May 11, 1984).
182. Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Broadwater, No.
CV 84-G-1208-W (N.D. Ala. May 11, 1984).
183. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Broadwater, No. CV 84-G-1208-W at 4 (N.D. Ala.
May 24, 1984) (mem. to order granting preliminary injunction).
184. Id.
185. See infra notes 210-53 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
187. See Chappell, 540 F. Supp. at 1096-98; Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 288-90; SED, 519
F. Supp. at 986-87.
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18(a)(2)(B) preemption because the PCB rule was adopted under section 6(e). 188
Thus, the court adopted the analysis that had caused the court in City of Mid-
dletown189 incorrectly to examine the question as one of express preemption
under section 18(a)(2)(B). None of the exceptions to section 18(a)(2)(B) pre-
emption was available: the state's order was not adopted under the authority of
another federal law; it did not prohibit use of PCBs in Alabama; and it was not
identical to federal requirements under TSCA because the order exceeded the
scope of the federal storage rule by prohibiting the further receipt of PCBs at
Emelle, pending compliance. As a result, the court declared that the state action
could not escape express preemption under section 18(a)(2)(B). 190
In the alternative, the court found that the state's temporary prohibition on
the disposal of further PCBs conflicted with federal law.191 Relying on Warren
County, the court concluded that the state order "completely frustrates the na-
tional goal that the public and the environment be protected from the harmful
effects of PCBs through uniform federal regulations."
192
The ban imposed by ADEM was invalid unless the state agency could have
justified it on the basis of a unique local geological or other physical condition
that presented a safety hazard. 193 The case, however, illustrates a situation in
which less drastic state enforcement measures could survive as long as courts
properly hold that the section 6(a)(6) exception from express preemption also
applies to the section 6(e) PCB disposal rule. 194 Contrary to the court's implica-
tion that uniform federal standards must prevail, 19 5 Congress envisioned a more
flexible approach in the case of disposal. In view of that intent, states should not
be prevented from imposing stiffer civil penalties or more stringent compliance
schedules than the EPA does. Congress expressly permitted more stringent
state requirements as long as those requirements do not frustrate the goal of safe
PCB disposal.
196
Analysis of the cases makes clear that the courts have not developed a uni-
form approach to this preemption question. Both the City of Middletown and
the Chemical Waste Management courts believed that section 18(a)(2)(B) ex-
pressly preempted state and local law dealing with PCB disposal because the
federal PCB disposal rule was not excluded specifically from the ambit of section
18(a)(2)(B) preemption.197 The court in SED rejected that analysis only to find
188. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Broadwater, No. CV 84-G-1208-W at 6 (N.D. Ala.
May 24, 1984) (mem. to order granting preliminary injunction).
189. No. 33133, slip op. at 25-26 (Sup. Ct. Middlesex Jud. Dist. Conn. Jan. 22, 1981).
190. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Broadwater, No. CV 84-G-1208-W at 6 (N.D.
Ala. May 24, 1984) (mem. to order granting preliminary injunction).
191. Id. at 7.
192. Id.
193. See infra text accompanying note 274.
194. See infra notes 210-53 and accompanying text.
195. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Broadwater, No. CV 84-G-1208-W at 7 (N.D. Ala.
May 24, 1984) (mem. to order granting preliminary injunction).
196. See infra text accompanying notes 266-67.
197. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Broadwater, No. CV 84-G-1208-W at 4-6 (N.D. Ala.
May 24, 1984) (mem. to order granting preliminary injunction); City of Middletown, slip op. at 24-
26.
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that section 18(a)(2)(B)'s express preemption was applicable to PCB disposal
since other federal PCB rules had "triggered" its operation. 198 On the other
hand, the courts in Chappell and Warren County determined that section
18(a)(2)(B) did not expressly preempt state or local law pertaining to PCB dis-
posal. 199 Warren County went a step further, however, and held that a local ban
on PCB disposal was preempted impliedly due to its frustration of the overall
purpose of TSCA.20° In short, the cases provide no consistent analytical basis to
determine whether a particular state or local law that prohibits or restricts PCB
disposal is preempted.
III. THE EXTENT OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
OVER THE DISPOSAL OF PCBs
The relationship of the federal PCB program to state and local law is con-
trolled by the doctrine of preemption, which is a significant aspect of federal-
ism. 201 Congress may preempt state law by an explicit statutory declaration to
that effect;20 2 in the absence of specific statutory language, however, preemption
also may be implied when it is implicit in the "structure and purpose" of the
statute.20 3 Implied preemption occurs either when Congress clearly has created
a federal regulatory structure "so pervasive" that it leaves "no room for the
States to supplement it" or when "the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject."' 2°4 Even when Congress has not expressly or impliedly foreclosed
state or local law altogether, state or local regulation is invalid "to the extent
198. SED, 519 F. Supp. at 986-88.
199. Chappell, 540 F. Supp. at 1096-98; Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 288-89.
200. Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 289-90. The district court in Chemical Waste Management
also determined that a state ban on PCB storage obstructed the intent of TSCA. Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Broadwater, No. CV 84-G-1208-W at 7 (N.D. Ala. May 24, 1984) (mem. to
order granting preliminary injunction).
201. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 623-24 (1975) (an important judicial mechanism for shaping
governmental authority within the federal system).
The doctrine arises from the supremacy clause of the Constitution, which states that the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
The invalidation of a state statute because it conflicts with a federal statute represents an application
of the preemption doctrine that is grounded on this constitutional foundation. Swift & Co. v. Wick-
ham, 382 U.S. 111, 125 (1965); see Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
152 (1982). The commerce clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, also may restrict
the ability of state and local governments to regulate PCBs. For example, a state law that interferes
with the flow of commerce may be held invalid in certain situations. See City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-29 (1977) (invalidating a New Jersey statute that prohibited the
importation of most liquid or solid waste that originated or was collected outside of New Jersey).
This Article, however, is exclusively concerned with the preemption of state and local law by TSCA
and its regulatory scheme.
202. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
203. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
204. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); accord City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973). Congressional intent to preempt, however,
must be "clear and manifest." Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
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that it actually conflicts with federal law."'20 5 Such a conflict exists when com-
pliance with both federal and state or local law is physically impossible2 0 6 or
when state or local law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
'20 7
4. Express Preemption
For the most part, TSCA is an exclusively federal program; Congress ex-
pressly preempted states and localities from performing a major role in most of
the regulatory functions. With a few exceptions, once the Administrator of the
EPA promulgates regulatory restraints to protect against an unreasonable risk
of harm from the manufacture, processing, distribution, or use of a particular
chemical, state and local governments are barred from regulating that chemical
against the same risk. Unlike the other major federal environmental statutes, 20 8
TSCA does not exclude more stringent state regulation from the scope of this
preemption. States that adopt more stringent programs must obtain the permis-
sion of the Administrator to escape preemption.
20 9
TSCA, however, does not preempt expressly any form of state or local regu-
latory action pertaining to the disposal of PCBs. This conclusion may seem to
ignore the language in section 18(a)(2)(B) 2 10 that expressly preempts most state
and local law that is inconsistent with federal rules issued under section 6 (ex-
cept for section 6(a)(6) disposal rules). Because the PCB disposal rule was
promulgated under section 6(e)(1) rather than section 6(a)(6),2 11 two courts
have found that section 18(a)(2)(B)'s express preemption language applies to the
federal PCB disposal rule.2 12 Nevertheless, such a literal reading of the statu-
tory text fails to implement the scheme envisioned by Congress when it enacted
this complex legislation.
The Senate version of TSCA did not contain an exclusion from section
18(a)(2)(B) preemption for section 6(a)(6) disposal rules;2 13 its genesis was in the
205. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983); accord Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978).
206. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); accord Fidel-
ity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
207. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); accord DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363
(1976); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971). For a comprehensive examination of preemp-
tion, see Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515; see also Murphy
& La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of
Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 392 (1976) (federal preemption of state legislation concern-
ing nuclear power).
208. The Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and RCRA explicitly preempt state requirements
that are weaker than federal requirements, but do not expressly preempt more stringent state re-
quirements. Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982); RCRA § 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929
(1982); Clean Air Act § 116,42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1982); see J. BONINE & T. McGARrTY, THE LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 364 (1984).
209. TSCA § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 2617.
210. TSCA § 18(a)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B).
211. 43 Fed. Reg. 7150 (1978).
212. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Broadwater, No. CV 84-G-1208-W at 4-6 (N.D. Ala.
May 24, 1984) (mer. to order granting preliminary injunction); City of Middletown, slip op. at 24-
26.
213. LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 286-87.
[Vol. 63
TOXIC SUBSTANCE DISPOSAL
House bill that was reported by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce.2 14 The Committee indicated that the exclusion in section 18(a)(2)(B)
recognized "the traditional role of the State and local governments in providing
for the protection of their citizens. ' 2 15 The language inserted by the House
Committee in section 6(a)(6)(B) reinforced this exclusion from TSCA's express
preemption provision. Mindful of "the inherent interests of the States and polit-
ical subdivisions respecting disposal of hazardous chemicals within their juris-
diction, '2 16 the Committee restricted the Administrator of the EPA to impose
"only those disposal requirements which do not violate any law of a State or a
political subdivision of a State."'2 17 The full House passed the bill containing the
Committee's language in both sections 6 and 18218 with only a minor alteration
in the wording of section 6(a)(6)(B).
2 19
The House Committee bill contained no provision specifically requiring the
EPA to take action to control PCBs; 220 Representatives Dingell and Gude of-
fered an amendment on the House floor to add section 6(e) to the bill.22 1 The
proposed amendment was criticized by several representatives who contended
that one particular chemical should not be singled out for action.22 2 Represen-
tative Dingell, however, stated that it was "entirely proper for Congress to set
priorities for action in any piece of legislation" and that control of PCBs should
be given such prompt attention.22 3 He explained that the following "perils" of
PCBs to humans were well known: "[PCBs can cause] numbness and pain in
the extremities, reduced sensitivity to pain and/or heat, slowed nervous reaction,
acne-like skin eruption, temporary failure of eyesight, sense of weakness and
cancer of the liver."' 224 Moreover, the presence of PCBs in the environment is
ubiquitous; according to Representative Dingell, PCBs are found in fish, cattle,
fowl, and mother's milk.22 5 Because PCBs do not degrade readily and do accu-
mulate in the food chain,22 6 Representative Dingell implied that the dangers
214. Id. at 380-81, 461.
215. Id. at 461.
216. Id. at 440.
217. Id. at 440-41.
218. Id. at 642, 655.
219. Id. at 579.
220. Id. at 297-405.
221. Id. at 580-81.
222. Id. at 582-84 (remarks of Representative McCollister); id. at 585-86 (remarks of Represen-
tative Eckhardt).
223. Id. at 509.
224. Id. at 508. See generally NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTh, CRrTE-
RIA FOR A RECOMMENDED STANDARD: OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO POLYCHLORINATED BI-
PHENYLS (PCBs) 27-125 (DHEW (NIOSH) Pub. No. 77-225, 1977) (lengthy treatment of the
biologic effects of exposure to PCBs).
225. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 581; see EPA, PCB MANUFACTURING, PROCESS-
ING, DISTRIBUTION IN COMMERCE AND USE BAN REGULATION, PROPOSED RULE-SuPPORT
DOCUMENT/VOLUNTARY DRAFr ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 28-29 (1978) (describing
the widespread distribution of PCBs).
226. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 581-82; see 42 Fed. Reg. 6532, 6538-41 (1977)
(detailed description of the persistence of PCBs and their tendency to accumulate in the
environment).
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posed by PCB contamination would multiply unless speedily checked. 227 The
amendment was passed on the strength of this kind of argument. 228
The Senate bill reported by the Committee on Commerce, like the House
Committee bill, required no specific measures to control PCBs. 229 Senator Nel-
son, however, sponsored an amendment on the Senate floor to add section 6(e)
requiring the EPA to regulate PCBs in an expeditious manner.23 0 The amend-
ment was adopted, 23 1 and the Senate bill that was sent to conference contained
no exclusion from section 18(a)(2)(B) preemption for section 6(a)(6) disposal
rules.
2 3 2
The conference combined the Senate and House versions of section 6(e),
resulting in a final text that retained elements of each.233 The House conferees
prevailed on the issue of excluding disposal rules from express preemption.
Thus, the substitute bill included the House language excluding section 6(a)(6)
disposal rules from the ambit of section 18(a)(2)(B) preemption.234 The substi-
tute also contained section 6(a)(6)(B) as drafted in the House.2 35 Neither the
conference report2 36 nor the House237 and Senate238 floor considerations of the
conference report discussed either why the Senate accepted the House language
or the implications for the PCB disposal rule. The conference substitute was
passed by both houses2 39 and was signed into law.24° Consequently, whatever
light the legislative history sheds on the intended relationship between the PCB
disposal rule and section 6(a)(6) must be found in the action of the House.
The House action reveals that it would be tenuous, at best, to assume that
Congress intended to create a dichotomous situation in which the PCB disposal
rule would have express preemptive effect while other disposal rules would lack
such effect. This conclusion is compelled by several indications that the House
intended to treat the PCB disposal rule like a section 6(a)(6) disposal rule for
preemption purposes. Thus, TSCA should not expressly preempt state or local
PCB disposal requirements that conflict with the federal rule.
Representative Dingell, who cosponsored the PCB amendment in the
House, realized that section 6(e) was unique in mandating regulatory action for
one specific chemical. 241 He apparently resolved this incongruity with section
6(a)'s more general regulatory scheme by treating section 6(e) as a form of spe-
227. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 581-82.
228. Id. at 590.
229. Id at 57-154.
230. Id. at 233-34.
231. Id. at 240.
232. LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 286-87.
233. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 690; compare id. at 279 (Senate version) and id. at
645 (House version) with id. at 25 (final bill).
234. Compare id. at 644 (House version) with id. at 38-39 (final bill).
235. Id. at 688; compare id. at 642 (House version) with id. at 21 (final bill).
236. Id. at 688-90, 707-08.
237. Id. at 741-54.
238. Id. at 721-41.
239. Id. at 740.
240. Id. at 53.
241. Id. at 509.
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cific regulation falling within the general framework of section 6(a). "This
amendment defines PCB's to be bad, hazardous, and dangerous, and it mandates
a program for their gradual removal ... ."242 In essence, the House made a
section 6(a) type of determination that PCBs presented "an unreasonable risk of
injury to health or the environment" 243 that necessitated the imposition of cer-
tain restraints authorized by section 6(a). In other words, section 6(e) merely
established a priority for EPA action that would guarantee the prompt regula-
tory restraints envisioned in section 6(a).244
The House also demonstrated its intent when it excluded section 6(a)(6)
disposal rules from express preemption under section 18 and drafted section
6(a)(6)(B) to acknowledge that fact. The House Committee that reported TSCA
stated that excluding disposal from express preemption recognized both the
"traditional role" of state and local governments in protecting their citizens and
their "inherent interests" concerning the disposal of toxic waste.24 5 Thus, the
limitation on express preemption not only is embodied in TSCA, but it also
represents a broad policy decision to allow state and local governments some
control over the siting of disposal facilities within their borders.
If the House had intended to carve out an exception to this clearly ex-
pressed policy in the case of PCB disposal, some discussion of that intent would
be expected during the course of legislative consideration. Such discussion espe-
cially was likely since TSCA, as drafted by the House Committee,24 6 would have
given no express preemptive effect to any PCB disposal rule under section
6(a)(6). The legislative history, however, provides no indication that the House
intended to give the PCB disposal rule special treatment with regard to express
preemption.247 On the other hand, after section 6(e) was grafted onto the House
version of section 6,248 Representative Broyhill, one of TSCA's sponsors, stated,
"[T]here is nothing in this act that affects the right of States to act in their
authority over disposal of hazardous. . . chemicals . -249 The authors of
section 6(e) did not contradict him .250
It is not difficult to explain why section 18(a)(2)(B) contains no language
excluding the PCB disposal rule from express preemptive effect: The section
18(a)(2)(B) exclusion language was drafted in committee, 251 whereas the specific
PCB provision, section 6(e), was added on the floor.252 Consequently, it is not
242. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 582.
243. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
244. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 508-09.
245. Id. at 440, 461. Regardless of whether the Committee was referring to the traditional re-
sponsibility of states and localities for land-use planning or the primary responsibility of state and
local governments to protect human health, it is plain that the House endorsed the rationale. See
supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
246. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 297-405.
247. Id. at 580-626, 667-719, 741-54.
248. Id. at 590.
249. Id. at 626.
250. Id.
251. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 220-28 and accompanying text.
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surprising that section 18(a)(2)(B)'s exclusion language does not anticipate the
promulgation of a PCB disposal rule under section 6(e) rather than section
6(a)(6). In view of the legislative history, it must be assumed that Congress
either inadvertently failed to change the relevant language in section 18(a)(2)(B)
after section 6(e) was added, or believed that the generic limitation applicable to
disposal rules would apply by implication to the PCB disposal rule.
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not intend to give
express preemptive effect to any disposal rule. Therefore, mechanistic applica-
tion of section 18(a)(2)(B) preemption to the federal PCB disposal rule would
usurp congressional power and result in the "destruction of the legislative pur-
pose." 253 That legislative purpose, not a literal interpretation of TSCA, should
be given expression by the courts.
B. Implied Preemption
Congress' refusal to give broad preemptive effect under section 18 to the
federal PCB disposal rule was an acknowledgement that states and localities
have an important role to play in the location and operation of toxic waste dis-
posal facilities.254 Nevertheless, that role is not unlimited because Congress set
out to achieve certain well-defined goals, such as the safe and proper disposal of
toxic chemicals like PCBs.25 5 As a result, the role of state and local govern-
ments in the disposal of PCBs is limited by implication to situations in which
their actions do not frustrate this fundamental goal of TSCA.
Two basic limitations must be inferred to preserve TSCA's integrity. First,
Congress ordered the Administrator of the EPA to establish disposal methods
for PCBs256 to prevent unreasonable risk of harm to health or the environ-
ment.25 7 Giving effect to less stringent disposal methods obviously would com-
promise the goal of safe PCB disposal; consequently, less stringent state or local
PCB disposal requirements are preempted by implication. As Congress in-
tended,258 however, states and local governments retain the flexibility to impose
more stringent disposal requirements than those established by the EPA. A log-
ical limit to more stringent state or local requirements must exist, nonetheless,
because safe disposal of PCBs depends on the the availability of facilities at
which PCBs may be properly disposed. The imposition of a disposal ban or
requirements so severe as to amount to a constructive ban serve to undercut the
goal of safe disposal by exacerbating the existing shortage of safe facilities. Such
a shortage would hamper attempts to clean up sites at which PCBs have been
disposed improperly and might lead to more illegal dumping. Thus, all forms of
disposal bans are impliedly preempted unless some unique local geological or
253. 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.38 (Rev. Sands 4th ed.
1984).
254. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 260-264 and accompanying text.
256. TSCA § 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e).
257. See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
258. See infra text accompanying notes 266-67.
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physical condition dictates that a particular ban is necessary to prevent environ-
mental injury.
259
The first limitation on the freedom of state and local governments to set
PCB disposal requirements stems from the implied preemption of state and local
requirements that are less stringent than the federal PCB disposal requirements.
This recognition of the TSCA PCB disposal rule as an absolute minimum stan-
dard is crucial to the effective functioning of the legislative design.
Congress stated, with utmost clarity, that the purpose of TSCA was to pro-
tect human health and the environment from the harmful effects of toxic chemi-
cals.26° Such protection was considered necessary because existing federal law
259. It can be argued that TSCA §§ 18(a)(2)(B) and 6(a)(6)(B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2617(a)(2)(B) and
2605(a)(6)(B), which explicitly exclude disposal rules from the scope of express preemption, preclude
courts from inferring any preemption for disposal rules. Moreover, § 18(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2617(a)(1), supports that contention somewhat by stating that nothing in TSCA, except as other-
wise provided in § 18(a)(2), "shall affect the authority of any State or political subdivision of a State
to establish or continue in effect regulation of any chemical substance, mixture, or article containing
a chemical substance or mixture." Nevertheless, a literal application of those provisions would frus-
trate an overriding objective of Congress in enacting TSCA-safe PCB disposal.
American courts long have recognized that the literal reading of statutory language may stifle
true legislative intent. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962). "It is a familiar rule, that a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers .... " Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). Consequently, when the literal interpretation of statutory language pro-
duces results clearly at variance with the legislation's purpose, courts have implemented the purpose
rather than the literal meaning. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922); United States v. National Marine Eng'rs'
Beneficial Ass'n, 294 F.2d 385, 391 (2d Cir. 1961); see also 2A N. SINGER, supra note 253, at § 46.07
(collecting cases to the same effect). According to Judge Learned Hand, courts must place them-
selves, as far as possible,
in the position of the legislature that uttered [the words of the statute], and decide whether
or not [the legislature] would declare that the situation that has arisen is within what it
wished to cover. Indeed, at times the purpose may be so manifest as to override even the
explicit words used.
Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959). In short, "common sense and evident
statutory purpose" must govern statutory construction. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25
(1947).
The congressional goal of proper PCB disposal could be circumvented in two ways if TSCA
were read to preclude inferring some limited preemption for the PCB disposal rule. First, a state or
local government could enact and enforce disposal requirements that are weaker than the federal
disposal rule. Second, those governments could impose actual or constructive bans on PCB disposal
when those bans are unrelated to the objective of safe disposal. Such bans would intensify needlessly
the shortage of available disposal capacity and might lead to more "midnight dumping." See infra
notes 268-73 and accompanying text. Thus, it is not reasonable to ascribe to Congress the intent to
preclude those forms of implied preemption necessary to implement faithfully the congressional
scheme for controlling the disposal of PCBs. See infra notes 260-65, 268-74 and accompanying text.
Rather, the only reasonable accommodation between the words and the policy of TSCA is to ascribe
to Congress the intent only to preclude implied preemption of state and local requirements that are
at least as stringent as the federal rule and that do not constitute actual or constructive bans on
disposal. Such an interpretation provides state and local governments with some leeway to control
PCB disposal while also ensuring a safe and effective PCB disposal program. See infra text accom-
panying notes 265-67. James Willard Hurst felt that, "Those who would properly apply a statute
must seek to fulfill the substance of its policy within the framework of its text-an effort that calls for
wisdom in not exalting either to exclusion of regard for the other." J. Hupsr, DEALING WITH
STATUTES 46 (1982).
260. The Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce stated that, "The purpose of S. 3149 is
to prevent unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment associated with the manufac-
ture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of chemical substances." LEGISLATIvE
HISTORY, supra note 89, at 157. In its report, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
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had failed to protect adequately against many of the risks created by the wide-
spread use of toxic chemicals in our society.261 Congress noted that one signifi-
cant deficiency in federal law was that the existing statutory authorities did not
govern comprehensively the disposal of these substances. The Report of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce pointedly referred to
the disposal of PCBs as an illustration of the dangers posed by the lack of ade-
quate federal control over disposal.
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [the Clean Water
Act], the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has
authority to control the discharge of PCBs into the waters. However,
there is no means for regulating other avenues through which the envi-
ronment is exposed to PCBs. For example, an estimated three-fourths
of the amount of discarded PCBs have been disposed of in landfills.
Under existing law there is no authority to deal with such disposal and
even though water emissions may be restricted, environmental expo-
sure through seepage from landfills will continue to occur.
262
Consequently, Congress took action in TSCA to plug this gap by authorizing the
EPA to issue necessary disposal rules263 and mandating the issuance of a federal
rule prescribing safe methods for the disposal of PCBs.
2 64
The EPA's PCB disposal rule partially fulfills the regulatory scheme as con-
ceived by Congress. It seeks to protect human health and the environment by
regulating the pernicious effects that result from the improper disposal of PCBs.
Commerce declared, "The overriding purpose of the bill is to provide protection of health and the
environment through authorities which are designed to prevent harm." Id. at 415.
261. The Senate Report described TSCA as "designed to fill a number of regulatory gaps which
currently exist." Id. at 157. As the House Report explained:
Present authorities for protecting against and regulating hazardous chemicals are frag-
mented and inadequate. Although there are a number of Federal laws which now provide
some authority for regulation (e.g., the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act [the Clean Water Act], the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, and the
Consumer Product Safety Act) conspicuous gaps exist in the protection provided by such
laws.
Id. at 414.
For example, a study by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which served as the
impetus for the original TSCA legislation introduced in the 92d Congress, id. at 159, pinpointed the
inadequacies of controls aimed solely at air and water pollution.
Most toxic substances are not exclusively air or water pollutants but can be found in vary-
ing quantities in air, water, soil, food, and industrial and consumer products. The multi-
plicity of ways by which man can be exposed to these substances makes it difficult for the
media-oriented authorities to consider the total exposure of an individual to a given sub-
stance, a consideration necessary for the establishment of adequate environmental
standards.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, Toxic SUBSTANCES v (1971). Consequently,
[r]ather than dealing with pollutants as they appear in air, in water, and on land, [TSCA]
represents a systematic and comprehensive approach to the problem. It relies on under-
standing the flow of potentially toxic substances throughout the entire range of activity-
from extraction to production to consumer use and to disposal.
Id. at vii; see also Note, supra note 21, at 37-39 (discussing the findings and impact of the CEQ's
study on toxic substances).
262. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 89, at 414.
263. TSCA § 6(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(6).
264. TSCA § 6(e)Cl)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(l)(A).
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Congress could not have intended state and local disposal requirements to pro-
vide less protection; to do so would undermine the disposal controls that Con-
gress believed were vital to safeguard health and the environment. Since the
conffict between the federal PCB disposal rule and less stringent state or local
requirements is irreconcilable, the state or local requirements are impliedly pre-
empted because they thwart one of Congress' purposes in enacting TSCA.2 65
TSCA, however, grants state and local governments the leeway to impose
tighter restrictions on the disposal of PCBs by excluding such restrictions from
the scope of express preemption. 266 Congress apparently envisioned a partner-
ship to control PCB disposal. Although the federal government would set the
minimum standards, states and localities could create their own regulatory pro-
grams designed to ensure safety in disposal activities. Permitting this kind of
involvement is reasonable since state and local governments are more aware of
local conditions than the federal government. The siting of PCB disposal facili-
ties, moreover, involves a land-use decision that traditionally has been a function
of state and local governments. 267 Nevertheless, this leeway must have its limit;
allowing states and localities to enact bans or constructive bans on the disposal
of PCBs, unless absolutely necessary for public safety, would obstruct an impor-
tant underlying purpose of TSCA: the proper disposal of PCBs.
The availability of adequate disposal capacity is a necessary precondition to
the safe disposal of PCBs. When the federal disposal rule was proposed in 1977,
approximately 1.2 billion pounds of PCBs existed in the United States: 758 mil-
lion pounds were still in use; 150 million pounds were loose in the environment;
and 290 million pounds were located in landfills and dumps that the EPA had
not approved.268 A tremendous demand therefore existed for adequate disposal
facilities. This demand will continue as PCBs still in use are retired from service
and as PCBs that were disposed of improperly are transferred to more satisfac-
tory facilities. The EPA already has expressed alarm over what it terms "a
grave national shortage of disposal sites for PCBs."
269
The imposition of a single disposal ban by a state or local government
would aggravate the existing shortage by restricting the number of available
sites. Moreover, the problem would intensify if the successful imposition of a
disposal ban in one jurisdiction inspired officials elsewhere to impose similar
bans. Little inspiration would be required: local opposition to new disposal fa-
cilities is nearly universal,270 and local officials (if not state officials) can be ex-
pected to respond to that opposition and endeavor to halt the construction of
new facilities. 27 1 Furthermore, state or local officials could try to force some
265. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941).
266. TSCA §§ 18(a)(2)(B), 6(a)(6)(B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2617(a)(2)(B), 2605(a)(6)(B).
267. See Florini, supra note 15, at 327.
268. Proposed EPA Disposal and Marking Rule for PCBs, 42 Fed. Reg. 26564 (1977).
269. Jellinek Memorandum, supra note 80, at 2.
270. See D. MORELL & C. MAGORIAN, supra note 6, at 2-3; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at
266-67.
271. See Florini, supra note 15, at 327; Wolf, supra note 7, at 485.
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existing facilities to close. Consequently, the magnitude of the problem could
become more severe as existing disposal facilities either exhausted their capacity
or were compelled to close, and new facilities were either unavailable or inade-
quate to satisfy the demand for proper disposal.
Any shortage in available disposal facilities-especially a severe shortage-
would cause the fees at available facilities to rise.2 7 2 In addition, the capacity at
existing facilities might not meet the demand. Therefore, some PCBs awaiting
safe disposal would be kept in storage or left in environmentally deficient dumps
and landfills. All of these difficulties arising from the shortage could encourage
illegal dumping.
273
The imposition of state and local disposal restrictions that are not reason-
ably attainable also would constrict the availability of adequate disposal capac-
ity. Such unreasonable restrictions would include mandating the use of
nonexistent or prohibitively expensive technology or the stipulation of certain
locally unattainable geologic, hydrologic, or geographic conditions for landfills.
The list would be limited only by the ingenuity of state or local officials. All
those restraints that could not be reasonably met should be seen for what they
are--constructive bans on PCB disposal.
Giving effect to an actual or constructive disposal ban would defeat the
congressional goal of safe disposal of PCBs unless the ban clearly was related in
an objective manner to the goal of safe disposal. Because bans normally would
present an obstacle to achievement of this goal, the test for determining a ban's
relationship to safe disposal should be designed to ferret out those bans that are
grounded on insubstantial or imaginary safety justifications. 274 It therefore
would be reasonable to require that a ban be justified on the basis of a unique
local condition-geologic, hydrologic, geographic, or physical-that necessitates
the ban from a safety perspective. Unless a ban satisfies this test, a court should
find it in irreconcilable conflict with a vital objective of TSCA and thus
preempted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act as a comprehensive
measure to ensure that the public and the environment are protected from the
dangers presented by toxic chemicals. Finding that PCBs were especially haz-
ardous, Congress mandated a precise schedule for their regulation. Of crucial
importance to the regulatory design for PCBs is the control of disposal methods.
Congress intended that PCBs would be disposed of in a manner that would safe-
272. See Florini, supra note 15, at 326.
273. See id. at 327.
274. Cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). In Kassel the Supreme
Court invalidated an Iowa statute that banned the use of certain large trucks within the state.
"[W]here, as here, the State's safety interest has been found to be illusory, and its regulations impair
significantly the federal interest in efficient and safe interstate transportation, the state law cannot be
harmonized with the Commerce Clause. Id. at 671.
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guard adequately the public and the environment from risk of further environ-
mental degradation.
Congress also recognized that state and local governments were entitled to
enter into a partnership with the federal government and share some of the re-
sponsibility for regulating PCB disposal; the shares, however, by necessity are
not equal. Since the federal PCB disposal rule is intended to prescribe safe and
adequate methods for PCB disposal, any state or local requirements that are less
stringent would compromise that purpose. The courts therefore should find
such requirements impliedly preempted by the federal rule. This limitation does
not disrupt the partnership: states and localities may act to protect their citizens
by imposing disposal requirements that are stricter than those ordinarily im-
posed by the EPA.
The partnership, however, would disintegrate if some states or localities
refused to share in the national responsibility for the proper disposal of PCBs.
Effectuation of the national goal of safe PCB disposal depends on the availability
of disposal facilities. If any state or local government has the unilateral power to
prevent the construction of federally approved disposal facilities, then every
other state or local government in the nation would possess the same ability.
The likely proliferation of bans-both actual and constructive-would aggravate
the hazards Congress sought to alleviate by enacting TSCA. Instead of protect-
ing the public, those obstructions might have the paradoxical result of encourag-
ing illegal disposal and "midnight dumping."
Nevertheless, some disposal bans could complement the objective of safe
disposal when a ban is necessary, based on unique local conditions, to prevent
environmental injury. Aside from those rare instances, prohibitive state and lo-
cal actions clearly frustrate the goal of safe disposal and, consequently, should
be held preempted by implication.
The nature of the partnership provided in TSCA should enable state and
local officials to work cooperatively with the federal government in an effort to
provide for safe disposal of PCBs. TSCA gives states and localities the option to
impose tighter restrictions and even disposal bans when those bans are justified
on an objective basis. TSCA, however, does not give any jurisdiction the right to
refuse, out of hand, to share in solving this national disposal problem. All levels
of government therefore have a role to play; their common efforts are required to
allay public fears by ensuring the safe disposal of PCBs.
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